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by Micha  l Lewandowski
The topic of this thesis is decision-making under risk. I focus my analysis on expected
utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1]. I am especially interested in model-
ing risk attitudes represented by Bernoulli utility functions that belong to the following
classes: Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (under-
stood as strictly decreasing) and in particular a subset thereof - Constant Relative Risk
Aversion. I build a theory of buying and selling price for a lottery, the concepts dened
by Raia [2], since such theory proves useful in analyzing a number of interesting issues
pertaining to risk attitudes' characteristics within expected utility model. In particular,
I analyze the following:
 Chapter 2 - expected utility without consequentialism, buying/selling price gap,
preference reversal, Rabin [3] paradox
 Chapter 3 - characterization results for CARA, DARA, CRRA, simple strategies
and an extension of Pratt [4] result on comparative risk aversion
 Chapter 4 - riskiness measure and its intuition, extended riskiness measure and its
existence, uniqueness and properties
Keywords: decision-making under risk, lottery, gamble, expected utility theory, risk
attitudes, CARA, DARA, CRRA, buying and selling price for a lottery
JEL Classication Numbers: D81, D03, C91
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Expected utility theory and related studies on individual risk attitudes are central to
many core areas of economic theory mainly due to its great simplicity and normative
appeal.
Since 1738 and Bernoulli [6] famous St. Petersburg paradox economists who tried to
describe individual preferences in a systematic manner were appealed by the idea of
expected utility maximization. It was however not until 1944 and von Neumann and
Morgenstern [1] seminal work when they realized what expected utility maximization
really entails in terms of real-world primitives. A step in this direction was made when
the idea of revealed preference was introduced. Economists assume that people have
preference relation over a certain set of consequences and they are entitled to do so since
by making choices people reveal their preferences. If a preference relation satises cer-
tain set of requirements called axioms, then this preference relation can be represented
by expected utility. And since preference relation is derived from choices really made,
there is a well dened link between expected utility maximization (articial concept)
and choices made by people (real world). Ignoring some technical requirements, the fol-
lowing are the main axioms of expected utility. An individual can rank all alternatives
in a choice set only if his preference relation is complete and transitive. This weak order
result is due to Cantor (1915)1. Hence with a preference relation dened over lotteries
that is complete and transitive, there exists an index or utility function representing
this preference relation. A great contribution of von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] was
to introduce independence axiom. It allows the index representing preference relation
over lotteries to be separable (in the summation) across states of the world and linear in
probabilities of these states. With independence axiom, one can separate consequences
in dierent states of the world, nd a utility index representing these consequences and
sum them up as weighted average, where weights are probabilities of these states.
1See Kreps [7].
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Twenty years later, Pratt [4] and Arrow [8] showed that within expected utility atti-
tudes towards risk may be represented solely the concavity properties of Bernoulli utility
function. They also dened an index representing risk aversion and explored its charac-
teristics and connections to dierent forms of utility functions.
This thesis is devoted to the study of risk attitudes under expected utility. Throughout
the subsequent chapters I will use and analyze two concepts, namely buying price for a
lottery and selling price for a lottery. These concepts were dened by Raia [2] but they
were never analyzed in depth. I will show that these measures and the understanding of
their characteristics may help in deeper understanding of expected utility model and risk
attitudes of Bernoulli utility function. I will use buying and selling price for a lottery
and their derived characteristics in three dierent contexts in each of the three chapters
that follow.
In the second chapter, I join in the debate led between economists who stress the fact that
expected utility is a good normative theory of behavior and economists who stress that
expected utility is not a good descriptive theory of behavior. Although in principle there
is no tension between these two claims, there seems to be a lot of antagonism between
researchers representing these claims. For simplicity, I will use "traditional economists"
label when referring to the rst and "behavioral economists" label when referring to the
second of the two groups. Traditional economists believe that expected utility is a good
theory since it is very simple, normatively appealing and, what is related to the latter,
has sharp easily testable predictions. Behavioral economists on the other hand stress
the fact that in many well documented settings people systematically violate expected
utility axioms, most notably independence. They believe that expected utility theory is
therefore not a good positive theory of choice. They propose other theories which are
meant to accommodate behavior not consistent with expected utility. Such theories are
designed to describe behavior better. Despite its descriptive advantages, there are some
risks involved in behavioral theories. If one model does not explain certain patterns of
behavior one can make it more elastic by increasing the degrees of freedom. The risk
is that by increasing the degrees of freedom the theory loses its normative power, i.e.
there are fewer testable predictions. Moreover, such theory is usually more complicated.
Another risk is that behavioral theories are often designed to explain behavior in certain
environment. It might turn out that the same arguments which were used to explain
behavior in one environment, may give wrong or even opposite conclusion in the other
environments.
Nevertheless, I believe that contrary to what some parts of the debate between tradi-
tional and behavioral economists might suggest, there is no fundamental tension between
traditional and behavioral approach. These two approaches are to some extent indepen-
dent and they serve dierent purposes. While traditional approach focuses on a general
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parsimonious theory that requires people to be consistent and avoid arbitrage, behav-
ioral economists seek for theories that describe people's behavior accurately in certain
well dened environment and such description may be used to support policy decisions
in this environment.
Behavioral economists often claim that certain kinds of behavior are not consistent with
expected utility. I think that equally important to the question what is not consistent
with expected utility theory is the question what exactly is consistent with expected
utility. In the second chapter of the thesis I will try to answer this type of question in
the following context.
Experiments reveal that people report much higher selling price for a lottery than buy-
ing price. It is widely believed that expected utility theory cannot accommodate such
evidence. Along the lines of Rubinstein [9] I will argue that large gap between selling and
buying price is possible within expected utility framework if one abandons the doctrine
of consequentialism with lifetime wealth interpretation of wealth. As an alternative to
total lifetime wealth I propose to introduce the concept of gambling wealth proposed by
Foster and Hart [5]. I discuss ways to test expected utility with gambling wealth and
advantages of this approach. In addition, I compare preference reversal involving selling
price valuation with the related phenomenon which I call preference reversal B involv-
ing buying price valuation. To this end I introduce a concept of buying/selling price
reversal, which is a connecting element between the two kinds of preference reversals.
Buying/selling price reversal occurs when given two lotteries the decision maker assigns
higher selling price and lower buying price for one lottery as compared to another. I
show that within expected utility buying/selling price reversal is possible, it is equivalent
to preference reversal B and it does not allow arbitrage whereas preference reversal is
not possible and it is susceptible to arbitrage.
The third chapter of the thesis is entirely technical. I present systematic characterization
results for three widely used risk attitude classes - CARA, DARA and CRRA. I dene
a concept of simple strategy. Within expected utility framework simple strategy pre-
scribes whether to accept a gamble or not only on the basis of initial wealth level and the
gamble itself. In a dynamic context simple strategy corresponds to Markov stationary
strategy. I dene wealth-invariant, "wealthier-accept more" and scale-invariant simple
strategies. I show that each of these simple strategies is equivalent to the corresponding
properties of buying and selling price for a lottery and also to the corresponding risk
attitudes' classes of Pratt [4], i.e. CARA, DARA and CRRA respectively. Moreover,
I discuss the dierence between nominal and multiplicative gambles and the way they
can be handled. I show how CARA and CRRA utility class may be derived from simple
functional equations belonging to the Cauchy family. Also, I show that buying price for
a lottery may be used as an index representing greater risk aversion relation equivalently
to other alternatives laid out in Pratt [4].
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Finally, in the fourth chapter I analyze measure of riskiness dened by Foster and Hart
[5]. I show simple intuition behind this measure and the model which leads to it. I
dene an extension of this measure based on decreasing absolute risk aversion utility
functions. For the more specialized case of constant relative risk aversion I obtain more
precise characteristics of an extended riskiness measure. Necessary and sucient condi-
tions for existence of such measure are given. In a series of propositions I establish the
theoretical relation which holds between an extended riskiness measure and Foster and
Hart [5] riskiness measure as a special case and buying and selling price for a lottery. I
show how these results may be used to make inferences about the riskiness for gambles
with negative expectation or gambles containing no losses. To this end I dene riskiness
for gambles minus a price for it. I show that if a price for a gamble corresponds to
buying or selling price for this gamble for some wealth level, the riskiness measure is
always well dened and meaningful.
As I mentioned before, parallel to discussing the above topics of interests, I build a
theory of buying and selling price. Such theory may be used in a number of other topics
which I did not discuss in this thesis.




Buying and selling price for risky
lotteries and expected utility
theory without consequentialism
Abstract
In this chapter I show along the lines of Rubinstein [9] that within expected utility large
buying and selling price gap is possible and Rabin [3] paradox may be resolved if only
initial wealth is allowed to be small. It implies giving up the doctrine of consequentialism
which may be reduced to requiring initial wealth to be total lifetime wealth of the decision
maker. Still, even when initial wealth is allowed to be small and interpreted narrowly
as gambling wealth, classic preference reversal is not possible within expected utility.
I show that only another kind of reversal which I call preference reversal B is possible
within expected utility. Preference reversal B occurs when buying price for one lottery is
higher than for another, but the latter lottery is chosen in a direct choice. I demonstrate
that classic preference reversal is susceptible to arbitrage whereas preference reversal B
is not which suggests that the latter reversal is more rational.
Keywords: expected utility, consequentialism, total wealth, gambling wealth, narrow
framing, Rabin [3] paradox, preference reversal, WTA/WTP disparity, buying and sell-
ing price for a lottery
5
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2.1 Introduction
Willingness-to-accept or selling price for a lottery is a minimal sure amount of money
which a person is willing to accept to forego the lottery. Willingness-to-pay or buying
price for a lottery on the other hand is a maximal sure amount of money which a person
is willing to pay in order to play the lottery. The disparity between willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) is a well-known phenomenon that arises in
experimental settings - see Thaler [10] or Kahneman et al. [11]. There is strong belief
in the literature that this evidence is not consistent with expected utility theory. Along
the lines of Rubinstein [12] I will argue that the source of this belief lies in associating
expected utility theory with the doctrine of consequentialism, according to which "the
decision maker makes all decisions having in mind a preference relation over the same
set of nal consequences". This association is harmless when considering Constant Ab-
solute Risk Aversion, as in this case decisions whether to accept a given lottery do not
depend on wealth. However as many studies conrm people usually exhibit Decreasing
Absolute Risk Aversion1, in which case wealth eects are present.
In practice the doctrine of consequentialism means that the initial wealth underlying
any decision whether to accept or reject a given lottery is assumed to be the decision
maker's lifetime wealth. It follows that most lotteries under consideration are small rela-
tive to initial wealth and therefore, by Rabin [3] argument for any reasonable level of risk
aversion expected utility predicts approximate risk neutrality towards such lotteries. In
this case, not only is expected utility incapable of accommodating large spreads between
buying and selling price, but also it is inconsistent with risk averse behavior for small
gambles2. Instead of burying expected utility theory I propose to divorce it from the
doctrine of consequentialism, i.e. relax the assumption that initial wealth underlying
any decision whether to accept a gamble is total lifetime wealth of the decision maker.
If initial wealth is allowed to be small, I will show that expected utility is consistent
with large buying/selling price spread, i.e. that within expected utility for reasonable3
levels of risk aversion one can obtain buying/selling price spread of the magnitude con-
sistent with experimental results. Following this nding I will propose an alternative
for consequentialism involving narrow framing. Instead of asserting that preferences are
always dened over total lifetime wealth, I will assume that preferences over gambling
are dened over gambling wealth, i.e this part of the decision maker's total wealth which
he designates for taking gambles. The idea is taken from Foster and Hart [5], although
the seeds of this approach, and in particular the idea of separating lifetime wealth and
something else for dierent decision problems, are already in Rubinstein [12]. I will
1In this paper decreasing absolute risk aversion means strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion.
2"Small" here means "small relative to lifetime wealth".
3Consistent with experimental evidence.
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propose several ways for testing the hypothesis of gambling wealth.
There are many papers on the disparity between willingness to accept and willingness
to pay for risky lotteries. It is part of a vast literature stream on WTA and WTP valu-
ations in general. For example, Schmidt et al. [13] explain WTA/WTP spread for risky
lotteries using prospect theory. They propose the third-generation prospect theory, in
which, unlike in the previous versions, reference point is allowed to be random. They
show that loss aversion in such model implies positive WTA/WTP gap4. In general,
there have been many accounts for the disparity based on non-expected utility models.
My aim in this chapter is not to oer a better explanation. I am even convinced that
specic behavioral theories will t empirical and experimental evidence better than ex-
pected utility model which I analyze. My goal is to show, that large spreads between
WTA and WTP, due entirely to wealth eects, are possible within expected utility if
only wealth is interpreted narrowly as gambling wealth. The advantage of this approach
is that expected utility has stronger normative appeal as compared to many behavioral
models. And hence, it is useful to know that certain patterns of preferences, or in this
case valuations, can be accommodated not only within behavioral models but also within
expected utility.
The approach I take in this chapter in general is not novel. As I mentioned before, Ru-
binstein [12] claims that a lot of recent confusion around expected utility, which led some
researchers to question it as a descriptive theory is caused by associating expected utility
theory with the assumption of consequentialism - the idea that there is a single preference
relation over the set of lotteries with prizes being the "nal wealth levels" such that the
decision maker at any wealth level W who has vNM preference relation %W over the set of
"wealth changes" derives that preference from % by L1 %W L2 () W +L1 % W +L2,
where L1 and L2 are lotteries. Also, Cox and Sadiraj [20] argue that the confusion around
expected utility in general, and Rabin's paradox in particular, is caused by the failure in
the literature to distinguish between expected utility theories, which stands for all mod-
els based on a set of axioms among which there is independence axiom, and a specic
expected utility model. They show on the basis on Rabin's argument that the expected
utility of income model is capable of accommodating evidence which the expected utility
of terminal model cannot accommodate. Finally, Palacios-Huerta and Serrano [19] show
that in case of Rabin's paradox, it is the assumption of rejecting small gambles over a
large range of wealth levels, and not expected utility, that does not match real-world
behavior. For more discussion on Rabin's paradox, see section 2.4.2.4.
My approach in this chapter follows the lines of the aforementioned articles. The dier-
ence is that these articles focus on Rabin's paradox and I focus here on buying/selling
price or WTA/WTP spread.
4In fact, by imposing some symmetry conditions on prospect theory utility function in their model,
it is possible to show that loss aversion is equivalent to positive WTA/WTP gap
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
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Related to buying/selling price disparity is the issue of preference reversal analyzed by
Grether and Plott [14]. There are two lotteries called the $-bet and the P-bet both of
which promise some prize with some probability and nothing otherwise such that the
probability of winning is higher for the P-bet but the prize is bigger for the $-bet. Pref-
erence reversal occurs when selling price for the $-bet is higher than that for the P-bet
but the P-bet is preferred to the $-bet in a direct choice5. A related possibility, which
I call preference reversal B occurs when buying price for the P-bet is higher than that
for the $-bet and yet the $-bet is chosen over the P-bet in a direct choice. I will show
that traditional preference reversal is susceptible to arbitrage and is not possible within
expected utility, whereas preference reversal B is possible within expected utility and it
does not allow arbitrage. This result may suggest that traditional preference reversal is
less rational that preference reversal B.
Buying and selling price for a lottery are the concepts introduced by Raia [2] in the
context of expected utility. More popular perhaps are the terms willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), respectively, the terms introduced primarily
in the context of non-expected utility theories. Except for the fact that buying and
selling price terms were introduced in a dierent context than WTP and WTA, these
terms have the same meaning. Since I focus on expected utility model I will henceforth
use the former terms.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I introduce the model, its assumptions,
denitions of buying and selling price for a lottery and buying/selling price reversal.
Then I state a couple of technical propositions which describe the shape and properties
of buying and selling price for a lottery for dierent risk attitudes. The subsequent sec-
tion contains the main theses of the paper. Focusing on constant relative risk aversion
class of utility functions, I demonstrate rst that expected utility with consequentialism
is likely to predict risk neutral behavior towards most gambles and eventually a gap
between buying and selling price becomes negligible. Second, I demonstrate that if the
doctrine of consequentialism is abandoned and wealth is allowed to move over the whole
domain, signicant spreads between buying and selling price are possible due to income
eects when wealth is suciently small. As a next step, I propose an alternative to
consequentialism involving narrow framing. Instead of dening wealth as total lifetime
wealth of the decision maker I suggest to use gambling wealth which is that part of the
decision maker total wealth which he designates for the purpose of taking gambles. I
discuss ways to test gambling wealth hypothesis and then I examine the possibility of
what I call preference reversal B which I compare to the related concept of traditional
preference reversal. I show that whereas preference reversal B is possible within expected
5Experimentally, in order to conrm preference reversal one must show that the asymmetry described
above occurs more often than the opposite kind of asymmetry, i.e. when the $-bet is preferred in a direct
choice but the P-bet gets higher selling price.
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utility framework with gambling wealth instead of total lifetime wealth and it does not
allow arbitrage opportunities, preference reversal allows arbitrage opportunities and is
not possible within expected utility. And nally I conclude. The appendix at the end
of this chapter contains proofs of the propositions.
2.2 The model
I start with basic assumptions and denitions.
Assumption 2.1. Preferences obey expected utility axioms. Bernoulli utility function
U : R ! R is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Denition 2.2. A lottery x is a real- and nite-valued random variable with nite
support. The space of all lotteries will be denoted X. I dene the maximal loss of
lottery x as: min(x) = minsupp(x).
The typical lottery will be denoted as x  (x1;p1;:::;xn;pn), where xi 2 R; i 2
f1;2;:::;ng are outcomes and pi 2 [0;1] i 2 f1;2;:::;ng the corresponding probabili-
ties. Outcomes should be interpreted here as monetary values. Although most results
that follow are true for more general lotteries, the nite support assumption is sucient
for the purposes of this paper. Now I dene buying and selling price for a lottery given
wealth level along the lines of Raia [2]. To avoid repetitions, I will henceforth skip
statements of the form: "Given utility function U satisfying assumption 2.1, any lottery
x and wealth W...".
Denition 2.3. I dene selling price and buying price for a lottery x at wealth W as
functions denoted, respectively, S(W;x) and B(W;x). Provided that they exist, values
of these functions will be determined by the following equations:
EU[W + x] = U[W + S(W;x)] (2.1)
EU[W + x   B(W;x)] = U(W) (2.2)
If utility function is dened over the whole real line as is the case for constant absolute
risk aversion, buying and selling price as functions of wealth exists for any wealth level
by assumption 2.1. If the domain of utility function is restricted to a part of real line as
is the case of constant relative risk aversion utility function analyzed here, I will specify
later on in the paper on which domain buying and selling price are dened as functions
of wealth.
In economic terms, given an individual with initial wealth W whose preferences are
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represented by utility function U(), S(W;x) is the minimal amount of money which he
demands for giving up lottery x. Similarly, B(W;x) is the maximal amount of money
which he is willing to pay in order to play lottery x. Additionally I dene a concept of
buying/selling price reversal.
Denition 2.4. Given two lotteries x and y and some wealth level W, dene buy-
ing/selling price reversal as:
S(W;y) > S(W;x) and B(W;x) > B(W;y)
This kind of preference pattern may be interpreted as follows. For a given initial wealth,
an individual's certainty equivalent for lottery y is higher than for lottery x, and yet
he is willing to pay more to play lottery x than to play lottery y. In other words, an
individual exhibiting buying/selling price reversal, may prefer to buy x than y if he
does not play any lottery initially. When, on the other hand, he does play the lottery
initially, he would prefer to sell x than y.
2.2.1 Buying short and selling short price for a lottery
It is possible to introduce buying short and selling short for a lottery x at wealth level W
denoted, respectively, by BS(W;x) and SS(W;x). They satisfy the following equations:
EU[W   x] = U[W   BS(W;x)] (2.3)
EU[W   x + SS(W;x)] = U(W) (2.4)
The interpretation of these two measures is the following: BS(W;x) is the maximal sure
amount of money which an individual would pay for not taking a short position in lottery
x. In other words if initial position is W   x, BS(W;x) is the maximal sure amount
of money which an individual is willing to pay for x. On the other hand SS(W;x) is
the minimal sure amount of money which an individual would accept for taking a short
position in x. In other words, it is the minimal selling price for a lottery which an
individual does not have initially.
Notice that buying price B(W;x) and SS(W;x) are evaluated with respect to the same
initial position W. Using Jensen's inequality it is easy to show that for strictly concave
utility function and a nondegenerate lottery x:
SS(W;x);BS(W;x) 2 (E[x];max(x))
where max(x) denotes the maximal consequence in the support of lottery x. As shown
in proposition 2.5 below, classical buying and selling price for a lottery are on the other
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hand strictly in between min(x) and E[x] for strictly concave utility function. Hence, for
strictly concave utility function, both SS(W;x) and BS(W;x) are strictly greater than
S(W;x) and B(W;x) for any wealth level.
Certain global (i.e. holding for any lottery) properties of buying and selling price as
functions of wealth are "mirrored" by the corresponding global properties of buying
short and selling short prices for a lottery. This is due to the simple relation which holds
between these measures and which is the following:
SS(W;x) =  B(W; x)
BS(W;x) =  S(W; x)
So, if for example buying and selling price for any no-degenerate lottery are strictly
concave and strictly increasing in W as is the case for CRRA utility function6, then
selling short and buying short prices for any non-degenerate lottery will be strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in W. If 0 < B(W;x) < S(W;x) as is the case for
DARA7, then 0 < SS(W;x) < BS(W;x).
2.3 Preliminary results
Before introducing the main point of this chapter I need a couple of theoretical results
which describe properties of buying and selling price for a lottery for dierent risk
attitudes. The most basic property of buying and selling price which is true for any
concave strictly increasing utility function is the following:
Proposition 2.5 (Concave). For any non-degenerate lottery x and any wealth W such
that buying and selling price exist, S(W;x) and B(W;x) lie in the interval (min(x);E(x)).
For a degenerate lottery x, S(W;x) = B(W;x) = x.
Proof. In the appendix.
Below I state propositions which characterize constant and decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion utility functions in terms of buying and selling price. Proofs of these propositions
may be found in chapter 3 of this thesis.8. Also I refer to chapter 3 of this thesis for
an extensive discussion on multiplicative and nominal gambles, risk aversion notions for
the two kinds of gambles, etc.
6See results 3.29, 3.31 and 3.20 in chpater 3.
7See lemma 3.30 in chapter 3.
8Although the rst of these results was proved already by Pratt [4], I refer to my proof due to its
unied treatment for the next three propositions.
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Proposition 2.6 (CARA). The following two statements are equivalent:
i. Bernoulli utility function exhibits CARA
ii. Buying and selling price are independent from wealth and equal i.e.
B(W;x) = S(W;x) = C; 8W
where  is absolute risk aversion coecient and C takes real values and depends
only on .
Proposition 2.7 (DARA). The following two statements are equivalent:
i. Bernoulli utility function exhibits DARA
ii. buying and selling price are increasing in W
B(W;x) > 0 () B(W;x) < S(W;x)
for a non-degenerate lottery x.
The above propositions show that in expected utility model a gap between buying and
selling price can only arise due to wealth eects. Selling price is higher than buying price
for a lottery for which I would be willing to pay positive amount only if absolute risk
aversion decreases in wealth. Since I want to focus on CRRA utility functions which is
a subclass of DARA utility functions I will additionally state one more proposition, the
proof of which may also be found in Lewandowski [15].
Proposition 2.8 (CRRA). The following two statements are equivalent:
i. Bernoulli utility function exhibits CRRA
ii. buying and selling price for any lottery are homogeneous of degree one i.e.
S(W;x) = S(W;x); 8 > 0
B(W;x) = B(W;x); 8 > 0
2.4 Buying/selling price spread within expected utility frame-
work
In this section I focus on constant relative risk aversion utility class, since it is simple and
empirically well validated. For convenience but without loss of generality I normalize
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1  ; 1 6=  > 0; x > 0
logx;  = 1; x > 0
(2.5)
Parameter  is required to be bounded. I also focus on non-degenerate lotteries with
non-negative values such that outcome zero gets positive probability. This restriction is
a matter of convenience as the forthcoming results extend to the case of general lotteries.
The following proposition is necessary to establish the domain and the range of buying
and selling price for a lottery as functions of wealth for the case of CRRA functions of
the above form. Before I state this proposition a couple of remarks might be useful.
First, since CRRA utility function used in this section is dened only for positive real
numbers I need to be sure that both sides of equations (2.2) and (2.1) dening buying
and selling price are well dened. Second, notice that CRRA function of the above form
is unbounded from below for   1 and bounded from below for 0 <  < 1. This is
the reason why for 0 <  < 1 the inmum of B(W;x) and S(W;x) cannot be equal to
min(x), the lower bound given in proposition 2.5. It turns out that there is a certain
threshold denoted by WL(x) 2 (0;E[x]) such that the inmum of B(W;x) and S(W;x)
is equal to WL(x) + min(x) which is greater than min(x).
Proposition 2.9 (CRRA2). Given the class of CRRA utility function of the form given
by (2.5) the following holds for any non-degenerate lottery x: for   1
 limW!0 B(W;x) = min(x)
 limW! min(x) S(W;x) = min(x)
Dene WL(x) = U 1[EU( min(x) + x)]. For 0 <  < 1
 limW!WL(x) B(W;x) = WL(x) + min(x),
 limW! min(x) S(W;x) = WL(x) + min(x)
Additionally,




S(W;x) = E[x] (2.6)
Proof. In the appendix.
The above proposition establishes the domain and the range of buying and selling price
for a given lottery x as functions of wealth for CRRA utility functions which are dened
above. Now that I introduced the necessary theoretical results, I proceed to the main
message of this chapter.
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/14404Chapter 2. Expected utility theory without consequentialism 14
2.4.1 Expected utility and consequentialism
Consequentialism is a doctrine that says that an individual makes all decisions according
to a preference relation dened over one set of nal consequences. In practice it means
that initial wealth taken into account when making whatever decision is interpreted as
the decision maker's total lifetime wealth. Most lotteries which a person may encounter
are small relative to his lifetime wealth. Especially, lotteries used in experiments have
values which are small relative to total lifetime wealth of experimental subjects. There-
fore to explain certain experimental results it is sucient to focus on lotteries that have
values which are negligible as compared to total lifetime wealth. To represent this fact
I assert here that lotteries have bounded values and consequentialism approximately
means that wealth tends to innity. In this case the following result holds:
Proposition 2.10. Expected utility with consequentialism and CRRA approximately
predicts no buying/selling price spread and risk neutrality.
Proof. The proof follows directly from equation (2.6) in proposition 2.9. To represent
the fact that most lotteries are small relative to lifetime wealth, I take any lottery with
bounded values and let wealth go to innity. What happens is that both selling price
and buying price tend to E[x] and hence the gap between them vanishes. Since the
distance E[x]   S(W;x) measures risk aversion, it is clear that there is no risk aversion
either.
This proposition is very similar to Rabin [3] calibration theorem conned to CRRA class
of utility functions. Reasonable levels of risk aversion for big gambles give rise to risk
neutral behavior towards small gambles within expected utility with consequentialism.
The dierence between Rabin [3] argument is that I claim after Rubinstein [9] that this
is due to consequentialism and not due to expected utility.
This negative result immediately rises the issue of what happens if I drop the assumption
of consequentialism. To answer this question I proceed in two steps. First, I show that
relaxing consequentialism is promising, i.e. large buying/selling price for a lottery for
reasonable levels of risk aversion may be obtained. Second, I propose an alternative
assumption which could replace the assumption of consequentialism.
In the rst step I allow wealth to vary freely. I will therefore analyze buying and selling
price for a lottery as functions of wealth. The goal is to see for what values of wealth
is the spread between buying and selling price likely to be high. To save on notation,
given a xed lottery x I shall write S(W;x) = S(W) and B(W;x) = B(W). I dene
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The following lemma can be used to infer certain properties of the relative gap between
buying and selling price.
Lemma 2.11. For dierentiable decreasing absolute risk aversion utility function, given
any non-degenerate lottery x and any wealth level W, the following holds:
 B0(W) < 1
 S0(W   B(W)) =
B0(W)
1 B0(W) and hence S0(W   B(W)) > B0(W)
 B0(W + S(W)) =
S0(W)
1+S0(W) and hence B0(W + S(W)) < S0(W)
 S0(W) =
S(W) B(W)
B(W) and B0(W) =
S(W) B(W)
S(W) for small positive S(W)
Proof. In the appendix.
Observe that the slope of buying price is always smaller than one whereas the slope
of selling price can be higher for small values of wealth. Before I state a proposition
describing the characteristics of the relative gap between buying and selling price I need
the following lemma:
Lemma 2.12. For CRRA utility function, given any non-degenerate lottery x, S(W)
and B(W) are concave functions.
Proof. See Lewandowski [15].
I focus now on the case when S(W) > B(W) > 0. The remaining cases can be analyzed
similarly. By proposition 2.9, to make sure that B(W) is positive I require that min(x)
cannot be lower than zero. The following proposition suggests that for CRRA utility
function the lower the wealth the higher the relative gap between buying and selling
price.
Proposition 2.13. For CRRA utility function and any lottery x with min(x)  0, the
relative gap between buying and selling price (W) is strictly decreasing in W.
Proof. In the appendix.
This proposition already gives an explanation of why buying/selling price gap cannot be
predicted within expected utility with consequentialism for small experimental lotteries.
The reason is that within expected utility, the gap between buying and selling price is
the highest for small values of wealth. So if initial wealth is small, expected utility model
can accommodate large buying and selling price gap. Obviously, assuming initial wealth
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to be total lifetime wealth of the decision maker is as far as one can go away from this
possibility.
Using lemma 2.11 and proposition 2.13 it is possible to infer certain properties of buying
and selling price when data on relative gap between buying and selling price is available.
Also, in the opposite direction, it is possible to infer properties of the relative gap
between buying and selling price when certain properties of buying and selling price are
known. Here, I mention just a couple of possibilities:
 the gap is equal to the slope of selling price for small B(W)
 for small values of B(W) the gap is equal to
B0(W)
1 B0(W) and hence
 the maximal gap depends on the slope of B(W) for small values of B(W)
The above mathematical results can be best illustrated on the basis of an example. Let
x be a lottery giving 100 euros or nothing with equal probabilities. The notation I use
for such a lottery is (100; 1
2;0; 1
2). Table 2.1 contains graphs of selling and buying price
for lottery x on the left and relative spread between them as functions of wealth W
on the right, each of them for CRRA utility function for three dierent coecients of
relative risk aversion: 1=2, 1 and 29. Notice that as stated in propositions above buying
and selling price are between min(x) and E[x] for  = 1 and  = 2. For  = 0:5 I can













Hence buying and selling price for  = 0:5 are indeed between WL(x)+min(x) and E[x].
Notice also that buying and selling price are increasing and strictly concave in wealth
and that selling price is higher than buying price over the whole domain of buying and
selling price. Finally as stated in proposition 2.13 the relative gap indeed is the highest
for the minimal value of wealth for which both buying and selling price are dened.
As illustrated by this simple example and stated formally in the propositions, the smaller
the wealth the greater the relative gap between buying and selling price. So if wealth is
small enough it is possible to obtain the gap between buying and selling price consistent
with experimental evidence for reasonable levels of risk aversion. I will summarize this
nding in a proposition.
Proposition 2.14. For levels of risk aversion which are consistent with experimental
evidence on risk attitudes there exists levels of wealth such that the expected utility model
predicts high relative gap between buying and selling price.
9The CRRA utility function is of the form given in (2.5).
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Table 2.1: Buying/selling price spread for x for CRRA utility function
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To illustrate the proposition consider again the above example. For instance, to obtain
selling price 30 per cent higher than buying price for the lottery in consideration and for
dierent relative risk aversion coecients I need wealth levels which are listed in table
2.2.





For example to obtain selling price 30% higher than buying price for the lottery (100; 1
2;0; 1
2)
for logarithmic utility function, initial wealth level of almost 44 is necessary. In the next
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subsection I introduce gambling wealth. If one believes that expected utility model ac-
curately predicts behavior 44 would correspond to the calibrated gambling wealth.
Assuming that the decision maker exhibits constant relative risk aversion, one can cali-
brate pairs of wealth and relative risk aversion consistent with any given level of relative
gap between selling and buying price for a given lottery.
2.4.2 Expected utility with gambling wealth
I have argued above that expected utility with total wealth interpretation of wealth
predicts no gap between buying and selling price and risk neutrality for a wide range
of gambles used in experiments. On the other hand I have shown that if small values
of wealth are possible one can obtain large gaps between buying and selling price for
a lottery for reasonable levels of risk aversion. One way to proceed would be to make
wealth a free parameter of the model. Then, if one believes that expected utility is a
good descriptive model of behavior, then given the data on risky choices one can cal-
ibrate which pairs of risk attitude and wealth level are consistent with the data, as I
have illustrated in table 2.2. Unfortunately, by making wealth a free parameter, the
model loses much of its predictive power. In particular, it is harder to falsify the model
or design testable predictions. Another way to proceed is to give wealth a new inter-
pretation or, even better, to develop a theory of endogenous wealth determination and
then to test whether this new interpretation gives better answers than consequentialist
interpretation. Since at this point I am unable to oer a theory of endogenous wealth
determination, I will only propose a new interpretation of wealth and ways to test it.
2.4.2.1 Gambling wealth
Consequentialism assumption implies that when making any kind of decision people
consider and have in mind their lifetime wealth. I think a good alternative assumption
is that people frame decisions narrowly and separate them into categories. When they
engage themselves in housing decisions they think about housing budget, when they
consume they think about consumption budget and when they consider gambling or
whether to accept of reject an oered gamble, they consider gambling budget. Of course,
personal assignment of dierent categories, budgets for them and time span for the
budgets is a very complex subject and certainly there is plenty of factors which in
uence
such decisions. Therefore I do not aim at a theory of endogenous budget determination.
For the purposes of this paper I focus only on gambling category and a budget assigned
to it, which I call gambling wealth. Gambling wealth was proposed informally by Foster
and Hart [5]. They dene gambling wealth as that part of total wealth designated only
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for taking gambles. Alternatively, if W is wealth designated for the purposes of living,
housing and consumption, then gambling wealth is what is left over.
In the light of the results from previous subsection, one can argue that the idea of
gambling wealth and more generally, the idea of separate budgets for dierent categories
of decisions could explain a number of interesting phenomena, for example:
 Agents who gamble more, have higher gambling wealth and therefore buying and
selling price gap for a given lottery is smaller than for less experienced individuals
 If an object is treated narrowly the disparity should be higher; if it is integrated
into a wider set of objects the disparity should decrease (Hanemann [16])
 The disparity should also be higher for articial environments such as experiments
than for a real market place.
This approach also has potential of explaining why buying/selling price gap is more
pronounced when objects of choice are not monetary, e.g. coee mugs. The more
specic or narrowly dened is the object of choice the more pronounced are wealth or
income eects since the value of the object is comparable with the money designated for
taking such objects.
The attractive feature of all these explanations is that they are all within expected utility
framework. The only novel thing is narrow framing with which expected utility model is
supplemented. Naturally, a theory of endogenous wealth determination would be much
appreciated to make this kind of explanations fully testable. At this point, I may suggest
a couple of ways to test gambling wealth hypothesis.
I propose the following experiment design which could shed light on the validity of this
approach. The rst stage of experiment is to give people small amount of money for
trading in gambles and then to elicit buying price and selling price for a given lottery.
It is possible to use sealed bid second price auction to elicit the true buying price and
Becker et al. [17] procedure to elicit the true selling price for a lottery. In the second
stage subjects are given more money for trading in gambles and again buying and selling
price is elicited. Alternatively, instead of giving the subjects more money it is possible
to scale down or up the lotteries being played. If subjects exhibit constant relative
risk aversion it should be equivalent to increasing or decreasing initial wealth - here the
characterization results from Lewandowski [15] are useful. If my explanation for the gap
between buying and selling price is correct then the gap should decrease when subjects
are given more gambling money or if the lotteries are scaled down without changing
gambling wealth.
The second experiment design is the following - I show some possible lotteries to the
subjects. Then I ask them how much money maximally, they would risk playing these
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lotteries. Their answer would correspond to their gambling wealth. Then I again repeat
the procedure as in the rst experiment design.
Another way to test the approach would be to elicit buying and selling prices for objects
from a very narrowly dened set, such as coee mugs and then extend the set of objects
to say all kitchen stu and again elicit buying and selling prices. The gap between
reported buying and selling price in the rst case should be bigger than the one in the
second case. The reason is that the money designated for trading in coee mugs is
denitely no bigger than money designated to trade in all kitchen stu. This also would
be consistent with results of Hanemann [16]. He argues that buying/selling price gap
should be small if there is some substitute on the market and should be bigger if there
is no.
Assuming the approach is valid then I propose the following experiment for calibrating
gambling wealth. The experiment should be designed to test risk attitudes10 and at the
same time to elicit selling and buying prices for lotteries. Given the data it is then easy
to calculate the underlying wealth level. This is then interpreted as gambling wealth.
More precisely, given observed buying and selling price for a given lottery I can calculate
wealth-relative risk aversion coecient pair which is consistent with these prices.
Gambling wealth hypothesis is promising. However, until there is no theory of gambling
wealth interpretation it can not be fully testable. In the next subsection I discuss another
concept which is related to gambling wealth - the concept of pocket cash by Fudenberg
and Levine [18]. The advantage of pocket cash idea is that there is a theory of pocket
cash determination. I would like to show in what respect pocket cash and gambling
wealth are similar and in what respect they dier.
2.4.2.2 Pocket cash
The idea of pocket cash money in the context of gambling decisions is the following. If
a small gamble is oered, an individual decides whether to take it or not on the basis
of what he has in his pockets, and hence pocket cash will be the relevant wealth level
for this decision. If, on the other hand, the same individual is oered a big gamble the
values of which exceed signicantly what he has in his pockets, the individual decides
more carefully taking into account his lifetime wealth. I will introduce now some details
of the model.
Fudenberg and Levine [18] develop a dynamic model in which long-run self controls the
series of short-run selves. In each period t there are two subperiods:
 bank subperiod
10Characterization results from Lewandowski [15] are useful here.
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/14404Chapter 2. Expected utility theory without consequentialism 21
{ consumption is not possible
{ wealth yt is divided between savings st, which remain in the bank, and pocket
cash xt which is carried to the nightclub
 nightclub subperiod
{ consumption 0  ct  xt is determined and xt  ct is returned to the bank at
the end of the period
{ wealth next period is yt+1 = R(st + xt   ct)
The long-run self can implement a, the optimum of the problem without self-control,
by simply choosing pocket cash xt = (1   a)yt to be the target consumption. In this
way self-control costs might be avoided.
 At the nightclub in the rst period there is a small probability the agent will be
oered a choice between several lotteries.
 The model predicts then that:
{ for large gambles risk aversion is relative to wealth
{ for small gambles it is relative to pocket cash
In this way the model can explain Rabin [3] paradox and large buying and selling price
gap.
2.4.2.3 Gambling wealth vs. pocket cash
An interesting feature of Fudenberg and Levine [18] approach is the following. Fudenberg
and Levine [18] estimate pocket cash to be roughly in the range of 20-100 dollars. This
is very similar to the range of gambling wealth necessary to get large and consistent with
the evidence buying/selling price gaps as indicated in table 2.2. Even if not supported
by the thorough econometric analysis it is striking that two totally dierent approaches
give rise to results of a very similar range.
In spite of the similarities, the two concepts are nevertheless dierent from each other.
To illustrate the dierence I will now discuss what testable predictions are obtained in
Rabin [3] paradox according to the dual self model with pocket cash and what testable
prediction are obtained according to gambling wealth approach.
Rabin [3] calibrated that expected utility model predicts the following:
 if a risk averse agent with wealth  350000 rejects the lottery (105;1=2; 100;1=2)
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 then he should reject the lottery (635000;1=2; 4000;1=2) at wealth level 340000
Denote the rst of the above lotteries by lottery 1 and the second by lottery 2. According
to Rabin [3] the rst statement is plausible and the second is not and hence it is called
a paradox.
In the dual-self model it is not true anymore that the decision maker rejects both lot-
teries. The rst lottery is small and hence it is evaluated relative to pocket cash. The
second lottery is big and therefore it is evaluated according to total wealth. Suppose
that the utility function is logarithmic. Then the following is true:
 lottery 1 small - reject if pocket cash < 2100
 lottery 2 large - accept if total wealth higher than 4035
Now both statements (pocket cash less than 2100 and total wealth higher than 4035)
are plausible.
Now consider gambling wealth interpretation. Suppose that utility is logarithmic. If
gambling wealth is less than 2100 then the decision maker should
 reject lottery 1
 reject lottery 2
There is nothing paradoxical in rejecting the second lottery since gambling wealth in
the amount of 2100 is too little to cover the loss ( 4000) which occurs with probability
1=2. No matter how attractive is the second prize, the decision maker cannot aord to
take lottery 2.
2.4.2.4 Rabin's paradox in the literature
Although, in this paper, I adopt the lines of Rubinstein [9], and focus on the assump-
tion of consequentialism, there has been other explanations for Rabin's paradox in the
literature. Palacios-Huerta and Serrano [19] claim that it is the assumption of rejecting
small gambles over a large range of wealth levels, which should be questioned as it does
not match real-world behavior. In particular they show that the assumption that an
expected utility maximizer turns down a given even-odds gamble with gain and loss for
a given range of wealth levels implies that there exists a positive lower bound on the
coecient of absolute risk aversion which can be calculated exactly. This lower bound is
an additional assumption imposed on a utility function. [19] show that in Rabin's exam-
ples this lower bound turns out to be very high, which is not consistent with empirical
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evidence. Another paper which addresses Rabin's critique of expected utility is Cox and
Sadiraj [20]. They argue that the source of confusion around expected utility lies in a
failure to distinguish between expected utility theories, i.e. all models based on a set of
axioms with independence axiom being the key axiom, and a specic expected utility
model. In a similar spirit to Rubinstein [12], they claim that Rabin in fact criticizes ex-
pected utility model of terminal wealth, in which there is a single preference relation over
nal wealth consequences. They show that expected utility of income model, in which
prizes are interpreted as changes in wealth levels, does not exhibit Rabin's paradoxical
behavior. In order to enable the dependence of preference over income on initial wealth,
they design an expected utility of initial wealth and income model. They demonstrate
that such a model can withstand the Rabin's critique if initial wealth is not additive to
income in the utility function. Safra and Segal [21] on the other hand point out that
paradoxes of the kind considered by Rabin, are not specic to expected utility theory.
They show that they can be constructed in non-expected utility theories as well.
2.5 Preference reversal versus buying/selling price rever-
sal
Preference reversal is commonly observed in experiments. Suppose that A C B denotes
"A preferred to B in a direct choice". Using my notation, preference reversal is possible
if:
S(W;y) > S(W;x) and x C y
Preference reversal is not possible within expected utility framework. To see this, note
that expected utility implies that x C y which can be equivalently written as EU(W +
x) > EU(W + y). By denition of S, this is equivalent to U(W + S(W;x)) > U(W +
S(W;y) and since utility function is strictly increasing: S(W;x) > S(W;y). So expected
utility implies the following:
S(W;y) > S(W;x) () y C x (2.7)
On the other hand buying/selling price is possible within expected utility framework:
Proposition 2.15. For a given decreasing absolute risk aversion utility function and
any wealth level W, buying/selling price reversal is possible.
Proof. In the appendix.
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By condition (2.7) this proposition implies that expected utility admits the possibility
of the following kind of preference reversal:
B(W;y) > B(W;x) and x C y
This kind of preference reversal will be referred to as preference reversal B. Preference
reversal B is equivalent to buying/selling price reversal within expected utility frame-
work.
Since expected utility theory imposes rather strong consistency assumptions, the result
above suggests that the possibility of preference reversal is less rational than the related
possibility of buying/selling price reversal or preference reversal B. The following two
propositions clarify the meaning of "less rational" beyond the strength of consistency
requirements argument.
Proposition 2.16. Suppose that preferences of the decision maker are continuous,
monotonic and that preference reversal pattern is xed for the range of wealth W 2
[w;  w]. Then arbitrage opportunities exist.
Proof. In the appendix.
Hence preference reversal allows arbitrage. On the other hand buying/selling price
reversal or preference reversal B does not allow arbitrage.
Proposition 2.17. Buying/selling price reversal does not allow arbitrage.
Proof. In the appendix.
The analysis shows that buying/selling price reversal or preference reversal B is more
rational than traditional preference reversal in two respects - it is consistent with ex-
pected utility and it does not allow arbitrage.
Preference reversal B or buying/selling price reversal occur within expected utility the-
ory. However it does not mean that they have to be meaningful. If buying/selling price
gap is small, then these two reversals are not meaningful i.e. they can occur theoretically
but the scope for their occurrence is negligible. For these reversals to be meaningful,
it is necessary for buying/selling price gap to be non-negligible. Testing of preference
reversal B might be therefore relevant only if wealth is interpreted narrowly, either as
gambling wealth or pocket cash. It is not relevant if the doctrine of consequentialism is
maintained. I will illustrate this fact in the following example.
Example 2.1. Suppose utility function is CRRA with relative risk aversion coecient
of 2, the $-bet (denote it by x) gives $100 or $0 with equal probabilities and the P-bet
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(denote it by y) gives $40 with probability 3=4 and $0 otherwise. The picture below
graphs buying and selling prices for these two lotteries as functions of wealth:
















Figure 2.1: Wealth region for buying/seeling price reversal
In the above example, there is an interval (50;75) of wealth for which buying/selling price
reversal (and hence also preference reversal B) occurs11. This is the common pattern
that buying/selling price reversal occurs only at small wealth and only in the limited
interval of wealth. The reason is that for such reversal to occur the $-bet has to have
higher variance and higher expected value. Then since as wealth becomes large, buying
and selling price approach expected value of a lottery, these prices for the $-bet have
to increase above those of the P-bet. For smaller values of wealth, the CRRA decision
maker would become very risk averse, so he will be solely preoccupied by the gamble's
variance. Therefore, both selling and buying price for the $-bet are below those of the
P-bet. Technically speaking, notice that if W denotes wealth level at which selling price
of x and y are equal, i.e. S(W;x) = S(W;y) = S, then by lemma 3.23 in chapter
3, it also holds that B(W + S;x) = B(W + S;y), so that B(W;x) crosses B(W;y)
at W = W +S. Hence the interval for which buying/selling price reversal occurs is of
length S exactly.
2.6 Concluding remarks
Expected utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] imposes a set of consis-
tency assumptions on choices among lotteries. The theory is used in a large part of
11The following holds S(50;y) = S(50;x) and B(75;y) = B(75;x).
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economic theory, including the famous Nash existence theorem. However there is a lot
of mainly experimental evidence that people often violate von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [1] axioms, in particular the most crucial among them - independence. In response
to this evidence economists started to question expected utility theory and investigate
other models of choice which describe human behavior better. However, since these new
theories usually have lower consistency requirements being imposed on the admissible
choice, they necessarily also have lower prediction power and less scope for testable pre-
dictions. Moreover, they also have weaker normative appeal, since the decision makers
violating expected utility axioms are vulnerable to money pumps. It is therefore an
important issue to identify patterns of choices and behavior which are consistent with
expected utility and contrast them with those which are impossible within expected util-
ity. In order to perform this task it is important to identify expected utility theory in
its bare form and in particular separate it from the doctrine of consequentialism. More
precisely, it is necessary to abandon the common practice of interpreting wealth variable
as total wealth position common to all decisions.
If one is willing to accept that wealth underlying gambling decisions is separated from
total wealth so that gambling decisions are framed narrowly, important implications
can be derived. If gambling wealth is small enough, which should be tested in an ex-
periment, then selling price for a lottery can be signicantly greater than buying price
without going beyond expected utility model and the extent of this dierence can be
as high as the one found in experiments. Also, the famous Rabin [3] paradox can be
resolved, suggesting that expected utility is not guilty here, but rather the doctrine of
consequentialism.
Still, traditional preference reversal is not possible even if wealth is allowed to be small.
If expected utility is to be regarded as a positive theory, it is denitely a negative result.
However, if one is willing to accept expected utility as a good normative theory, then the
same result is very useful. It informs us then, that preference reversal is not rational.
It is conrmed further by the result proved in the paper, that individuals exhibiting
preference reversal are susceptible to arbitrage under certain mild conditions. The same
kind of arbitrage, which I prefer to call strong arbitrage, is not possible within expected
utility. What might be interesting is that another kind of preference reversal, which I
call preference reversal B and which involves buying price in place of selling price and
otherwise is the same as the traditional preference reversal, is possible within expected
utility and is not vulnerable to arbitrage as shown in the paper. What it could suggest if
one is willing to treat expected utility as a good normative theory, is that preference re-
versal B is perhaps "more rational" than traditional preference reversal. An interesting
thing to do in the future would be to check whether people exhibit preference reversal
B as frequently as they exhibit the traditional preference reversal and if not, then check
why this is so.
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2.7 Appendix
In what follows I will need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.18. For any lottery x and any wealth level W, the following holds:
S[W;x   B(W;x)] = 0 (2.8)
S[W   B(W;x);x] = B(W;x) (2.9)
B[W + S(W;x);x] = S(W;x) (2.10)
The proof is directly from denitions. For details, see Lewandowski [15].
2.7.1 Proof of proposition 2.5
Proposition 2.19 (Concave). For any concave and strictly increasing utility function
and a non-degenerate lottery x the following holds:
min(x) < B(W;x) < E[x]
min(x) < S(W;x) < E[x]
Proof. Notice rst, that for degenerate lottery x = x, equations (2.1) and (2.2)imply
the following:
W + S(W;x) = W + x
W + x   B(W;x) = W
And so S(W;x) = B(W;x) = x. From now on I will focus on a non-degenerate lottery
x. I will prove the proposition only for the case of selling price. For buying price the
proof is similar. I dene S  S(W;x). Suppose mini2f1;:::;ng xi  S. Then notice that:






 U(W + S)
with strict inequality for any xi 6= mini2f1;:::;ng xi. Since lottery x is non-degenerate
there exists at least one xi 6= mini2f1;:::;ng xi Hence
n X
i=1
piU(W + xi) > U(W + S)
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So S cannot be the selling price - a contradiction.
Suppose now that S  E[x]. By strict Jensen's inequality
EU[W + x] < U[W + E[x]]  U(W + S)
So S cannot be the selling price - a contradiction. So I have shown that indeed
mini2f1;:::;ng xi < S(W;x) < E[x].
Hence for lotteries with bounded values buying and selling price are bounded below by
the minimal prize of the lottery and bounded above by the expected value of the lottery.
2.7.2 Proof of proposition 2.9






1 ; 0 <  < 1
 1;   1
(2.11)
By proposition 2.5 buying and selling price are necessarily greater than min(x). For
  1 the utility function is unbounded from below, therefore from the denition it
follows that: limW!0 B(W;x) = min(x) and limW! min(x) S(W;x) = min(x). On the
other hand for 0 <  < 1 the utility function is bounded from below. Additionally,
W   B(W;x) is strictly increasing in W since
@B(W;x)
@W < 1. Therefore the lower bound
for the domain of B(W;x) as a function of W is given by WL(x) such that:
EU( min(x) + x) = U(WL(x))
It follows that limW!WL(x) B(W;x) = WL(x) + min(x). Similarly, the lower bound for
the domain of S(W;x) as a function of W is  min(x) and hence: limW! min(x) S(W;x) =
WL(x) + min(x) since
EU( min(x) + x) = U( min(x) + S( min(x);x))
= U( min(x) + min(x) + U 1(EU( min(x) + x)))
Proof. Now I prove the following statement:
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Note that the Absolute Risk Aversion for CRRA utility function has the form A(W) =

W . Hence as W goes to innity and  is bounded (no extreme risk aversion) A(W)
tends to zero. This implies risk neutrality and hence limW!1 S(W;x) = limW!1 B(W;x) =
E[x] irrespective of relative risk aversion coecient.
2.7.3 Proof of lemma 2.11






EU0(W + x   B(W;x))
Since utility function is strictly increasing it must be that dB
dW < 1.
Now I prove that S0(W   B(W)) =
B0(W)
1 B0(W) and S0(W   B(W)) > B0(W)
From lemma 2.18 equation (2.9), using chain rule of dierentiation, I have B0(W) =
S0(W   B(W))(1   B0(W)) Rearranging gives
S0(W   B(W)) =
B0(W)
1   B0(W)
Since 0 < B0(W) < 1 by the above argument and proposition 2.7, I obtain S0(W  
B(W)) > B0(W).
Similarly I prove that B0(W + S(W)) =
S0(W)
1+S0(W) and B0(W + S(W)) < S0(W).
Using equation (2.10) from lemma 2.18, I have S0(W) = B0(W +S(W))(1+S0(W)) and
hence
B0(W + S(W)) =
S0(W)
1 + S0(W)
Since S0(W) > 0 by proposition 2.7, I get B0(W + S(W)) < S0(W)
Now I will prove that S0(W) =
S(W) B(W)
B(W) for small positive S(W).
And by proposition 2.7 S(W) > B(W) > 0. So when S(W) is small and positive, then
also B(W) is small and positive. By lemma 2.18 equation (2.9), S(W  B(W)) = B(W).
For small B(W) using rst order Taylor expansion B(W) = S(W)  dS





Similarly, by lemma 2.18 equation (2.10), B(W + S(W)) = S(W). Hence, for small
S(W) using rst order Taylor expansion S(W) = B(W) + dB
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2.7.4 Proof of proposition 2.13
Without loss of generality I assume that min(x) = 0. Fix x such that min(x) = 0. By
proposition 2.9, B(W) and S(W) are positive and hence by proposition 2.7 (W) is
positive over the whole range. Notice that range of (W) is determined by proposition
2.9. If the domain of S(W) is denoted DS and the domain of B(W) is denoted DB,
then the domain of (W) is just DS \ DB = DB. In particular, for   1 the domain
of (W) is the interval (0;1) and for  2 (0;1), the domain is the interval (WL(x);1),
where WL(x) is dened as in proposition 2.9. To prove the proposition I have to check












From lemma 2.18 I have the following equations:
B(W) = S(W   B(W))
S(W) = B(W + S(W))
For the proof rst order eects are not sucient, but it turns out second order eects
are. Therefore, by Taylor expansion of the second order I get from the above equations:
B(W) = S(W)   S0(W)B(W) + S00(W)B2(W)
S(W) = B(W) + B0(W)S(W) + B00(W)S2(W)
I only need to check the dierence from equation (2.12) which I can rewrite as follows


















where the last inequality follows from the fact that both B(W) and S(W) are concave
(by lemma 2.12) and nonnegative (by proposition 2.9).
2.7.5 Proof of proposition 2.15
Take any non-degenerate lottery y with S(W;y) > B(W;y). Such a lottery exists
by proposition 2.7. I can nd a sequence of real numbers which all are greater than
B(W;y) and smaller than S(W;y). I can then treat these numbers as a support for
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a new lottery x. I assign probabilities to each of this numbers such that they sum to
one and are positive for at least two of these numbers (such that the resulting lottery




xi > E[x] > S(W;x) > B(W;x) > min
i2f1;:::;ng
xi > B(W;y)
And hence the result is proved.
2.7.6 Proof of proposition 2.16
Suppose that at any wealth W 2 [w;  w] the decision maker prefers lottery x to lottery
y in a direct choice but assigns higher certainty equivalent to lottery y. Given such
pattern of preferences it is easy to design an arbitrage strategy that extracts at least
W   w from this decision maker. Suppose W 2 [w;  w] is an initial wealth. Construct a
sequence Wi; i 2 f1;2;:::;ng such that:
 W0 = W
 Wi = W0  
Pi
k=1 k; i > 0 i 2 1;2;:::;n
 Wn  w; Wn+1 < w
 for i even (including 0) Wi+1 + x  Wi + y
 for i odd: CE(Wi + x) < CE(Wi+1 + y)
Notice that such a sequence exists by monotonicity and continuity of preferences and by
properties of real numbers. Assume w.l.o.g. that W0 + y  W0. The arbitrage strategy
is now the following:
0) Take y
1) Exchange y for x and pay me 1
2) Exchange x for CE(W1 + x)   W1
3) Exchange CE(W1 + x) for CE(W1 + y) and pay me 2
4) Exchange CE(W2 + y)   W2 for y
5) Exchange y for x and pay me 3
6) Exchange x for CE(W3 + x)   W3
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7) Exchange CE(W3 + x) for CE(W3 + y) and pay me 4
8) Exchange CE(W4 + y)   W4 for y
...............
The above arbitrage strategy extracts the amount of wealth equal to W   w from the
decision maker.
2.7.7 Proof of proposition 2.17
In what follows I will try to construct an arbitrage strategy to exploit the decision
maker and show that it is not possible. Given DARA utility function U, take x such
that B(W;x) < 0. I will examine only this case since in the other cases the proof is
trivial.
Suppose rst, the decision maker initially has non-random position W. If the price b for
the lottery is bigger than B(W;x), the decision maker will not buy it. Hence, a price
which is a part of an arbitrage strategy must be smaller than B(W;x). Given such price
b, the decision maker buys the lottery. His new position is W + x   b. If the price s is
smaller than S(W   b;x), then the decision maker does not want to sell. Hence a price
which is a part of an arbitrage strategy must be bigger than S(W  b;x). By proposition
2.7, I know that S is strictly increasing and b < B(W;x). Therefore:
s > S(W   b;x) > S(W   B(W;x);x) = B(W;x) > b
where the equality follows from lemma 2.18 equation (2.9).
Suppose now, that the decision maker initially has a random position W + x. By the
same argument as above the price s, which is a part of an arbitrage strategy has to be
greater that S(W;x), otherwise the decision maker would not sell the lottery x. After
selling the lottery, the decision maker's new position is W + s. The price b which is a
part of an arbitrage strategy has to be smaller than B(W + s;x). By lemma 2.11, I
know that
@B(W;x)
@W  1 for all W  0. Hence:
s   S(W;x) > B(W + s;x)   B(W + S(W;x);x)
By lemma 2.18 equation (2.10), I know that B(W + S(W;x);x) = S(W;x), and hence:
s > B(W + s;x) > b
That proves that with decision maker's initial position equal to either W or W + x, all
arbitrage strategies have the property that s > b. However, this cannot be an arbitrage
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strategy since it makes negative prot equal to b   s. This proves that there are no
arbitrage strategies.




Risk attitudes, buying and selling
price for a lottery and simple
strategies
Abstract
In this chapter I introduce a concept of simple strategy and dene three kinds of such
strategies. For three classes of utility functions - CARA, DARA and CRRA I state and
prove equivalent characterizations in terms of the corresponding simple strategy charac-
teristics, the corresponding properties of buying and selling price and the corresponding
functional equations for utility function. I also prove an extension of famous Pratt [4]
theorem on comparative risk aversion. More specically, I show that buying price for a
lottery can be used alternatively to other measures including selling price to compare
risk aversion across individuals. Additionally a number of propositions on both selling
and buying price for a lottery and CRRA utility class are proved.
Keywords: characterization, comparative risk aversion, simple strategy, Pratt [4], Ar-
row [8] coecient of risk aversion, CARA, DARA, CRRA
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3.1 Introduction
In this paper I will analyze four ways to represent risk attitudes within expected utility,
corresponding to the behavior of the following functions:
 absolute and relative risk aversion
 buying and selling price for a lottery
 simple strategy
 Bernoulli utility
The rst of the aforementioned representations is based on local risk attitudes dened
by Pratt [4] and Arrow [8]. Within this representation three classes of individual risk
attitudes and the associated Bernoulli utility functions will be discussed, namely con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA), decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)1 and a
subset thereof - constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The second representation is
given by the properties of buying and selling price for a lottery, the concepts dened by
Raia [2]. Buying price for a lottery is a maximal sure amount which the decision maker
is willing to pay for a lottery. Selling price for a lottery is a minimal sure amount which
the decision maker is willing to accept to forgo a lottery. The alternative names which
are often used in non-expected utility theories and experimental work are willingness
to pay (WTP) for a lottery and willingness to accept (WTA) for a lottery, respectively.
Within this representation I will consider buying and selling price properties in separa-
tion as well as the way they are linked together. In case of CRRA I will analyze both
the properties of classic buying and selling price as well as the properties of buying and
selling price designed for multiplicative gambles. I will show in what sense CARA and
buying and selling price for nominal gambles are analogous to CRRA and buying and
selling price for multiplicative gambles. Buying and selling price representation might
shed light on a recent experimental evidence documenting large spreads between elicited
buying and selling prices for the same lottery as well as preference reversal phenomenon.
I analyze these issues in the accompanying paper Lewandowski [22]. The third represen-
tation involves the concept of a simple strategy. Simple strategy recommends whether
to accept a given gamble or not only on the basis of the gamble itself and the initial
wealth which the decision maker is endowed with prior to taking the decision. In a dy-
namic setting simple strategy corresponds to the notion of Markov stationary strategy.
Wealth-invariant simple strategy is a strategy which for any gamble does not depend
on initial wealth. Among wealth-varying simple strategies I focus on "wealthier-accept
1In this paper DARA means strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/14404Chapter 3. Risk attitudes - characterization results 36
more" simple strategy for which the acceptance set increases when initial wealth in-
creases. And nally, a special case of "wealthier-accept more" simple strategy is scale
invariant simple strategy which does not depend on scale. If a gamble is accepted at
some wealth level, then if the gamble's outcomes and wealth are multiplied by some
positive factor, the new gamble will be accepted at a new wealth level.
And nally, I will show that CARA and CRRA class of utility functions can be derived
from functional equations belonging to the Cauchy family.
I will prove three equivalence results for these four representations valid within the
framework of expected utility. Each of the three classes of Bernoulli utility function
will be shown equivalent to the corresponding properties of buying and selling prices
and to the corresponding simple strategy. Additionally, I will show that CARA and
CRRA classes of utility function can be derived from Cauchy functional equations. The










ARA and RRA 
risk attitudes
Figure 3.1: Diagrammatic representation of the equivalency results
The rst three representations described above will be dealt with in section 3.4, whereas
the last representation involving Cauchy functional equations will be analyzed in section
3.5 Even though some parts of these results are well known I decided to put them all
together both for the sake of completeness as for the sake of their novel formulation
and the unifying method of proof. For example, the equivalence between CARA, wealth
invariance and constant buying and selling price has been around since Pratt [4], how-
ever the way it's stated in this paper is much more straightforward and ready to use.
The concept of simple strategy is a novel component introduced by Foster and Hart [5]
in the context of constant relative risk aversion class2. "Wealthier-accept more" and
wealth-invariant simple strategies are dened for the purpose of this paper.
The result, which is perhaps not so well known among economists is the one for constant
relative risk aversion utility class. For example, in section 4 Proposition 1 Barberis and
Huang [23] restrict certainty equivalent functional, which they denote (), to the case
of constant relative risk aversion utility functions. They claim that "the same method
of proof used in Proposition 1 can also be applied to other explicitly dened forms of
2Foster and Hart [5] introduced the concept of homogeneous simple strategy.
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(), whether expected utility or not, that satisfy the homogeneity property3". In the
paper I show that except for CRRA there are no other expected utility forms of cer-
tainty equivalent that satisfy homogeneity property and hence the statement Barberis
and Huang [23] make is not correct. The result concerning CRRA as well as other char-
acterization results in this paper may help in clarifying some of the imprecise statements
from the literature such as the one cited above.
The three characterization results in this paper show that the same message can be de-
livered in four dierent ways depending on the needs and on the context. For example
to assume CRRA is equivalent to assume positive homogeneity of buying and selling
prices, and also equivalent to assuming scale-invariance of simple strategy. Moreover,
CRRA utility function satises a simple functional equation. The formulation in terms
of simple strategies makes the notion of CRRA more intuitive since it is expressed di-
rectly in terms of the decision maker's actions. Therefore, when testing the hypothesis
of CRRA, it might be useful to test instead whether simple strategy is homogeneous.
Alternatively, if the experimenter has access to data on buying and selling price, it might
be more straightforward to test homogeneity of these. Thus the characterization results
form the bridge between dierent formulations.
Another result of this paper shows that buying price for a lottery can be used to compare
risk aversion of two agents in an equivalent way as selling price for a lottery and other
methods laid out in Pratt [4] famous theorem4. This result is an extension of Pratt
[4] theorem which characterizes comparative risk aversion. It might be useful in testing
comparative risk aversion when the data on individual buying prices is available whereas
the data on individual selling prices is not. Also, using buying price has one technical
advantage over using selling price. Buying price exhibits the so called delta property5
whereas selling price in general does not6. It means that calibration process in case of
buying price might be much easier than in case of selling price.
The paper is divided into three parts. In section 3.2 I introduce denitions and as-
sumptions of the model in a formal way. In section 3.3 I introduce the idea of nominal
and multiplicative gambles and the way risk aversion is incorporated for these two con-
cepts. In section 3.4 I state four main results. In section 3.5 I state additional results
which introduce Cauchy functional equations and their equivalence with CRRA and
CARA utility class and describe certain theoretical properties of buying and selling
price. These properties are invoked in the other chapters. In section 3.7 main results
are proved together with a number of auxiliary lemmas and propositions.
3I.e. positive homogeneity of certainty equivalence.
4Selling price for a lottery is the negative or risk compensation used in Pratt [4].
5For details see appendix lemma 3.36.
6The exception is CARA class for which selling price exhibits delta property.
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3.2 The model
In this section I introduce the assumptions, denitions of buying and selling price and
the notion of simple strategies.
Assumption 3.1. Preferences obey expected utility axioms. Bernoulli utility function
U : R ! R is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Denition 3.2. A lottery x is a real- and nite-valued random variable with nite
support. I dene a maximal loss of lottery x as min(x) = minsupp(x). Wealth W is a
real number.
Although most of the results that follow are true for more general lotteries, the nite
support assumption is adopted for the sake of simplicity. Now I dene buying and
selling price for a lottery given wealth level along the lines of Raia [2]. To avoid
repetitions, I will henceforth skip statements of the form: "Given utility function U
satisfying assumption 3.1, any lottery x and wealth W...".
Denition 3.3. I dene selling price S(W;x) and buying price B(W;x) for a lottery x
at wealth W as follows:
EU[W + x] = U[W + S(W;x)] (3.1)
EU[W + x   B(W;x)] = U(W) (3.2)
The domain of S and B, i.e. all admissible pairs (W;x), is assumed to be such that the
left-hand side and the right-hand side of the above equations are well dened, given the
domain of U7. The space of such admissible pairs will be denoted by X. Notice that
functions B and S are then well dened by assumption 3.1.
Denition 3.4. An individual's simple strategy s : X ! f1;0g assigns to each admis-
sible pair (W;x) either value 1 or 0, representing "Accept x at W" or "Reject x at W",
respectively.
Since the aim in this chapter is to link the concept of simple strategy to expected utility
maximization, I impose the following non-triviality assumption:
7If the utility function is not dened over the whole real line as is the case of CRRA utility function,
one has to make sure rst that both sides of the above equations are well dened and second that the
equality has a solution. For details see Lewandowski [22].
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Assumption 3.5. For any non-degenerate lottery x and wealth W > 0, there exists a
unique p
W;x 2 (min(x);E[x]) such that:
s(W;x   p) = 1; p  p
W;x
s(W;x   p) = 0; p > p
W;x
This assumption asserts that there are other lotteries which are accepted beyond those
with no losses and there are other lotteries which are rejected beyond those with negative
expectation. This assumption imposes monotonicity of preferences and risk aversion.
Notice that in expected utility setup given wealth W and lottery x, p
W;x = B(W;x).
Denition 3.6. Simple strategy is wealth-invariant if
s(W1;x) = 1 () s(W2;x) = 1; 8W1;W2 (3.3)
And the above holds for all x that are accepted.
It follows that if simple strategy is wealth-varying (i.e. not wealth-invariant) then there
exists lottery x and two dierent wealth levels W1;W2 such that:
s(W1;x) = 1 ^ s(W2;x) = 0
To understand the dierence between wealth-varying and wealth-invariant simple strat-
egy suppose there is a lottery with only positive outcomes. Any individual who prefers
less to more will accept such lottery irrespective of initial wealth level. It does not mean
however that the underlying simple strategy is wealth-invariant. That is the reason why
wealth-varying simple strategy is dened using the existence quantier and not the uni-
versal quantier.
I introduce now two kinds of wealth-varying simple strategies:
Denition 3.7. Wealth-varying simple strategy is of "wealthier-accept more" type if
s(W1;x) = 1 ^ s(W2;x) = 0 ) W1 > W2 (3.4)
Denition 3.8. Wealth-varying simple strategy is scale-invariant or homogeneous if
s(W;x) = 1 () s(W;x) = 1; 8W; 8 > 0 (3.5)
And this holds for all x that are accepted.
I am interested in analyzing risk attitudes. It is convenient to dene two kinds of utility
function transformations which do not alter the underlying risk attitudes.
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Lemma 3.9. If U is a utility function, relative and absolute risk aversion function is
unique up to the following transformation of U:
A : fv(x) = aU(x) + bg
where  = f1; 1g, a;b 2 R and a > 0.
Furthermore, for a < 0, relative and absolute risk aversion changes only its sign.
Proof. Since Bernoulli utility function is unique only up to ane transformation au()+b,
A > 0 represents the same risk attitudes as u(). Furthermore, relative and absolute
risk aversion obtained from u(x) and u( x) is the same in sign and magnitude and that
from  u(x) and  u( x) is of opposite sign but the same magnitude.
Observe that if u(x) is increasing and concave, then u( x) is decreasing and concave,
 u(x) is decreasing and convex, and  u( x) is increasing and convex. The absolute
value of Arrow, Pratt risk aversion measures is however the same for all these functions.
The use of such transformations will prove useful when characterizing dierent classes
of risk attitudes by means of Cauchy family functional equations.
3.3 Nominal and multiplicative gambles
3.3.1 Nominal gambles and wealth invariance vs multiplicative gam-
bles and scale invariance
Suppose an individual with wealth W faces a choice whether to accept or reject gamble
x. The consequences of x are monetary. Consider two dierent objectives this individual
might have:
a. wealth from accepting x should increase on average in nominal terms
b. return from x should be positive on average
Let's dene random return from x given wealth W > 0 as h = 1 + x
W . Gamble x
is called a nominal gamble since its units are expressed in nominal terms. Gamble
h is called a multiplicative gamble and it is dimensionless. It is assumed that the
maximal loss of x is strictly smaller than W so that gamble h takes only positive values.
Aumann and Serrano [24] suggest that nancial instruments may be regarded as such
multiplicative gambles. Notice that nominal gamble does not depend on wealth and
the acceptance of such gamble using the rst of the above criteria does not depend
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on initial wealth W. On the other hand multiplicative gamble does depend on initial
wealth and the acceptance of such gamble using the second of the above criteria also
depends on initial wealth. However, what the multiplicative gamble is invariant to is
scale. No matter in what units I measure consequences8, or, alternatively, whether I
multiply both initial wealth and the nominal gamble x, by the same positive factor, the
resulting multiplicative gamble remains unchanged. Notice that the two criteria above
do not invoke any arguments on risk aversion. In fact, the rst criterion amounts to
risk neutrality in a classical sense. Similarly, I think it is useful to think of the second
criterion as risk neutrality for multiplicative gambles. I would like to show below that
the two widely used classes of utility functions, CARA and CRRA, are generalizations
of the above two criteria, respectively - generalizations in the sense of introducing risk
aversion, specic to nominal gambles and wealth invariance in the rst case and specic
to multiplicative gambles and scale invariance in the second case.
First, notice that the rst criterion above is equivalent to evaluating the arithmetic mean
of a nominal gamble:
accept x () Ea(W + x)  W () Ea(x)  0 (3.6)
where Ea denotes arithmetic mean operator.9 The second criterion, on the other hand,
is equivalent to the following:
accept h () W  Eg(h)  W () Eg(h)  1 (3.7)
where Eg denotes geometric mean operator. The detailed explanation why the above is
true may be found in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
Since h takes only positive values, the condition on the right of (3.7) may be rewritten
as:
logEg(h)  0








Ea log(W + x)  logW
The conclusion from this analysis is very interesting: the second criterion saying that
the return from x should be positive on average is equivalent to expected utility from
accepting x is at least as high as from rejecting x, where the Bernoulli utility function is
8Both, values of x and initial wealth W.
9Generally, in the whole thesis, if not explicitly stated otherwise E denotes arithmetic mean operator.
Here, dierent notation is used to stress the dierence to geometric mean operator Eg, which will also
be used.
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logarithmic. So a kind of risk neutrality for multiplicative gambles (the second criterion)
is equivalent to logarithmic risk aversion in classical sense i.e. for nominal gambles.
This fact is a basis for Foster and Hart [5] paper which will be analyzed in the next
chapter of this thesis. I would like to demonstrate now that the same transformation
of the two criteria a. and b. discussed in this section lead to CARA and CRRA class,
respectively. The goal is to introduce risk aversion into criteria a. and b. As noted
before, criteria a. and b. are equivalent to the following two conditions, respectively:
Eax  0
Ea log(h)  0 (3.8)
Consider, CARA utility function U(x) = 1 e x
 . By denition, exchanging x with U(x)
in the rst of the above equation gives rise to expected utility decision making with
CARA Bernoulli utility function. Now consider exchanging log x with U(logx) in the
second case:
U(logx) =
















And this is expected utility decision making with CRRA Bernoulli utility function.
3.3.2 Buying and selling price for multiplicative gambles
In the previous section, I introduced the concepts of buying and selling price for a
lottery. These concepts were specically designed to deal with nominal gambles. It is
possible to dene similar concepts for multiplicative gambles. If x is a nominal gamble
and W > L(x) is initial wealth, denote h as multiplicative gamble and write h = W+x
W .
Denition 3.10. Given utility function: U : R+ ! R, a multiplicative gamble h, I
dene selling return price s(W;h) and buying return price b(W;h) for a multiplicative
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gamble h at wealth W as follows:







The interpretation of these two measures is the following. Selling return price s(W;h)
is the minimal sure return which an individual whose preferences are represented by
U would demand to forgo random return h. On the other hand, buying return price
b(W;h) is the maximal sure return which an individual is willing to forgo for the right
to play gamble h. It is easy to show in as similar way to that in lemma 3.24 that









Since it is assumed that W > L(x), it is guaranteed that all the arguments in the above
two equations are non-negative and hence by monotonicity and continuity of U, the two
equations are well dened and there exist unique selling and buying return prices. There
is a simple relationship between selling price for nominal lottery x and selling return
price for multiplicative gamble:
s(W;h) = 1 +
S(W;x)
W
An analogous relationship between b(W;h) and B(W;x) is however more complex and,






= EU(Wh   B(W;x))
3.4 Results
The rst result below is essentially just a reformulation and combination of results
appearing in Pratt [4] and Raia [2]. I restate it in a convenient form for completeness.
The proofs of all the following results, including the rst one are provided in section 3.7.
Proposition 3.11 (CARA). The following three statements are equivalent:
i. strategy is wealth-invariant
ii. Bernoulli utility function exhibits CARA
iii. buying and selling price are independent from wealth and equal i.e.
B(W;x) = S(W;x) = C; 8W (3.12)
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where  is absolute risk aversion coecient and C takes real values and depends
only on .
Proposition 3.12 (DARA). The following three statements are equivalent:
i. strategy is wealthier - accept more
ii. Bernoulli utility function exhibits DARA
iii. buying and selling price are increasing in W and
B(W;x) > 0 () B(W;x) < S(W;x)
Proposition 3.13 (CRRA). The following four statements are equivalent:
i. strategy is scale-invariant
ii. Bernoulli utility function exhibits CRRA
iii. buying and selling price for any lottery are homogeneous of degree one i.e.
S(W;x) = S(W;x); 8 > 0 (3.13)
B(W;x) = B(W;x); 8 > 0 (3.14)
iv. buying and selling return prices for any multiplicative lottery are independent from
wealth and equal i.e.
b(W;h) = s(W;h) = C; 8W (3.15)
where  is relative risk aversion coecient and C takes real values and depends
only on . Additionally,
b(W;h) = b(W;h); 8 > 0 (3.16)
s(W;h) = s(W;h); 8 > 0 (3.17)
In the last proposition concerning CRRA class of utility function, I have added an
additional item which characterizes buying and selling return prices. As suggested by
Roberto Serrano, it is useful to see that buying and selling return price in case of
CRRA share the same characteristics with buying and selling price in case of CARA. In
particular, conditions (3.12) and (3.15) make it clear that in case of CRRA buying and
selling return price are equal to each other and independent from wealth the same way as
in case of CARA buying and selling price are equal to each other and independent from
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wealth. Conditions (3.16) and (3.17) are on the other hand specic for buying and selling
return prices in case of CRRA. These conditions state that buying and selling return
prices are both homogeneous in a gamble. Since buying and selling return prices were
designed to deal with multiplicative gambles and CRRA class is a scale-invariant, these
conditions are perhaps more intuitive then the analogous conditions (3.13) and (3.14)
which concern buying and selling price, the concepts designed for nominal gambles.
The above three propositions characterize three widely used risk attitude classes of utility
function. Certain parts of these propositions are already known in the literature and
some are novel. The advantage lies in putting all these results together and oering a
unifying way to prove them. In applied work these results should be especially useful
since they allow to interchangeably use the notions of risk attitude classes of utility
function represented by absolute and relative risk aversion, the corresponding simple
strategies dened above and properties of buying and selling price for a lottery. It should
help in testing of risk attitudes, as it might be simpler to test either buying and selling
price for a lottery or simple strategies depending on the context. Experiments should
be designed as naturally as possible. Subjects are reluctant to engage in considerations
regarding abstract notions. Here, the advantage of a simple strategy notion is apparent
due to its direct reference to actions. In other contexts on the other hand, where trading
atmosphere is to be created in experimental settings, buying and selling price for a lottery
might be more appropriate. Needless to say, the three equivalent characterizations of
risk attitudes classes of utility function should be of advantage both in theoretical as
well as applied work. Notice further, that a number of useful observation might be
made after careful examination of the above results. For example, since CRRA is a
subclass of DARA, it is therefore the case that homogeneous simple strategy is a subset
of "wealthier-accept more" simple strategies. Such conclusion is not obvious without
the propositions above.
The next result that follows is an extension of Pratt [4] famous result on comparative
risk aversion. It establishes an equivalence between buying and selling price as an index
for greater-risk aversion relation.
Proposition 3.14. For two dierent utility functions U1() and U2() with non-increasing
absolute risk aversion, let S1(W;x), B1(W;x) and S2(W;x), B2(W;x) be the correspond-
ing buying and selling price functions. The following equivalence holds:
8W 8x : 9  > 0 jxij <  8i 2 f1;:::;ng
S1(W;x) > S2(W;x) () B1(W;x) > B2(W;x)
This proposition may be useful as well in both theoretical and empirical work. Since
buying price for a lottery exhibits delta property no matter what the risk attitude, and
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selling price in general does not10 it might be simpler to use buying price as an index
of comparative risk aversion since the proposition says that one can use the two indices
interchangeably. In empirical settings, one might have data only on buying price for
a lottery and not on selling price. In this case inferences regarding selling price for a
lottery and hence absolute risk aversion are still possible due to the above result.
3.5 Additional results
3.5.1 Additional characterization results
The following results give further insights into the nature of widely used risk attitudes
classes. By means of a couple of simple functional equations one can give alternative
proofs to the rst equivalence results (i. () ii.) in propositions 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13.
The equations I will analyze belong to a Cauchy family of functional equations:
a. v(x + y) = v(x) + v(y)
b. v(x + y) = v(x)v(y)
c. v(xy) = v(x) + v(y)
d. v(xy) = v(x)v(y)
It is useful to treat the above functions as transformations described in lemma 3.9 of
the corresponding utility functions. It proves much easier to work with transformations
and not directly with utility functions since these transformations are chosen to satisfy
the simplest functional equation with a given concavity/convexity properties. By lemma
3.9 I am then entitled to transform function v into a utility function U which satises
any desired properties - e.g. normalized conveniently, increasing and concave without
changing the risk attitudes properties.
I will now show that the above four functional equations are equivalent characterizations
of risk neutral, CARA, logarithmic and CRRA preferences respectively.
Proposition 3.15. All twice continuously dierentiable functions v : R ! R that satisfy
the following functional equation: v(x + y) = v(x) + v(y) for all x;y belonging to the
domain of v, are of the following form:
v(x) = cx; c 2 R
10Selling price exhibits delta property only in case of CARA.
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Proof. For x = y = 0, v(0) = v(0) + v(0). It implies that v(0) = 0. Rearrange the
equation and divide by y:









I dene c = v0(0) and integrate both sides from 0 to x of the above equation to obtain
v(x) = cx as required.
Proposition 3.16. All twice continuously dierentiable functions v : R ! R that satisfy
the following functional equation: v(x+y) = v(x)v(y) for all x;y belonging to the domain
of v, are of the following form:
v(x) = ecx; c 2 R
Proof. For y = 0, v(x) = v(x)v(0). It implies that v(0) = 1. Using the equation I can
write:









Dene c = v0(0) and rearrange to obtain:
[logv(x)]0 = c
Now integrate both sides from 0 to x and exponentiate on both sides to obtain:
v(x) = ecx
Proposition 3.17. All twice continuously dierentiable functions v : R++ ! R that
satisfy the following functional equation: v(xy) = v(x) + v(y) for all x;y belonging to
the domain of v, are of the following form:
v(x) = clogx; c 2 R
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Proof. For y = 1, v(x) = v(x) + v(1). It implies that v(1) = 0. I dene y = 1 + h. Now
using the equation I can write:













Now dene c = v0(1) and integrate both sides from 1 to x to obtain:
v(x) = clogx
Proposition 3.18. All twice continuously dierentiable functions v : R++ ! R that
satisfy the following functional equation: v(xy) = v(x)v(y) for all x;y belonging to the
domain of v, are of the following form:
v(x) = xc; c 2 R
Proof. For y = 1, v(x) = v(x)v(1). It implies that v(1) = 1. I dene y = 1 + h. Now
using the equation I can write:





v(1 + h)   1
h










Integrate both sides from 1 to x and rearrange to obtain:
v(x) = xc
It is worth noting that the above propositions could be stated in a stronger form. To
prove that any of the four functional equations implies the corresponding function, one
does not need to assume that v is twice continuously dierentiable. It is true for any
continuous or monotonic functions. Furthermore, it requires a full proof only for the
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rst of the four functional equations, as the others may be reduced to it by using ap-
propriate transformation of v. This is also the reason why all the four equations belong
to one family of Cauchy equations. Suppose function v satises v(x + y) = v(x)v(y).
Dene a transformation of v, namely g(x) = logv(x). It is straightforward to see that
g(x) satises g(x + y) = g(x) + g(y), so it has to be that g(x) = cx and going back to
the original function v(x) = ecx. Similarly, the corresponding transformation of v which
satises v(xy) = v(x) + v(y) is g(x) = v(ex) and the corresponding transformation of v
which satises v(xy) = v(x)v(y) is g(x) = logv(ex).
To see how the above functional equations connect to expected utility decision making,
suppose that W is initial wealth, x is a lottery to be chosen and U is a utility function
which is transformed from the corresponding function v satisfying one of the four func-
tional equations. Dene the following expression a(W;x) = EU(W + x)   U(W). The
list below corresponds to the four functional equations above:
a. a(W;x) = EU(x)
b. a(W;x) = U(W)(EU(x)   1)
c. a(W;x) = EU(W + x)   U(W)
d. a(W;x) = U()[EU(W + x)   U(W)]
The conclusions are the following. In the rst case, corresponding to linear utility
function, the utility from accepting lottery x does not depend on W. In the second
case, corresponding to CARA (without linear) utility function, the acceptance of x
does not depend on W but the utility value from accepting x depends on W. In case
c., corresponding to logarithmic utility function, the utility from accepting x at W
does not depend on scale . In case d., corresponding to CRRA (without log) utility
function, the acceptance of x at W does not depend on scale  but the utility value
from accepting it does.
It can therefore be proposed to call linear utility function - totally wealth invariant,
logarithmic utility function- totally scale invariant, other than linear CARA functions -
acceptance wealth invariant, and other than logarithmic CRRA functions - acceptance
scale invariant.
The characterization of CRRA utility function may be supplemented by the following
lemma:
Lemma 3.19. Given twice continuously dierentiable utility function u : R++ ! R and
; 2 R;  > 0;  6= 0, the following holds:
u(x) = u(x) () u(x) = Ax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where A > 0 is a constant.
Proof. Suciency is straightforward.



































Notice that since Bernoulli utility function is unique up to ane transformation, utility
function of the form u(x) = Ax, for A > 0 and  6= 0 is equivalent to utility function of
the form u(x) = ax+b, where a > 0 and b 2 R. Hence for any CRRA utility function11
there exists an equivalent utility function that is homogeneous of some degree dierent
than zero.
3.5.2 Additional results on buying and selling price
This chapter is part of the research project developing a theory of buying and selling
price for a lottery. Therefore, apart from results which may be useful for their own sake,
the following are some additional results describing properties of buying and selling
price. In particular it turns out that buying and selling price for a lottery x are concave
in W for CRRA utility functions.
Proposition 3.20. For any wealth W and any non-degenerate lottery x, such that
B(W;x) and S(W;x) are well dened, the following holds for CRRA utility function:
11Except for the logarithm, but since it is a limiting case of a power utility function one can ignore it.
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 B(W;x) and S(W;x) are strictly concave in W
 B(W;x) + B((1   )W;y) < B(W;x + y), 8 2 (0;1)
 S(W;x) + S((1   )W;y) < S(W;x + y), 8 2 (0;1)
Proof. In section 3.7.
Below I examine the additivity properties of buying and selling price. It turns out that
buying price is sub-additive for all strictly increasing and strictly concave utility func-
tions and selling price is sub-additive only for CRRA subclass of such utility functions.
Proposition 3.21. Suppose lottery x has at least two values in the support. Let U be
a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. For any W and any lottery x such
that buying and selling price are well dened and n 2 Z, n > 1, the following holds:
B(W;nx) < nB(W;x) (3.18)
Proof. In section 3.7.
For buying price the result holds for all concave functions12. For selling price an equiv-




2x for x < 1
1
2x + 3
2 for x  1
This is clearly a continuous weakly concave function. Now consider the following lottery:
x = (5; 1
2;0; 1
2), i.e. a lottery which gives 5 or 0 with equal probabilities. Simple
calculation delivers that the selling price13 for this lottery is equal to 1. Now, let's
consider another lottery y = 2x = (10; 1
2;0; 1
2). Selling price for this lottery is equal to
7
2. Hence, I have S(0;2x) = 7
2 > 2 = 2S(0;x).
It is clear therefore that the result equivalent to proposition 3.21 for selling price does
not hold in general. However it does hold for certain classes of utility functions. Below
I show that it holds for the CRRA class:
Proposition 3.22. Suppose lottery x has at least two values in the support. Let U be
a strictly increasing and strictly concave CRRA function. For any W and any lottery x
12Even if the function is not strictly concave, the result is still true if I change strict inequality to
weak inequality in equation (3.18)above.
13Without loss of generality I consider W = 0.
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such that buying and selling price are well dened and n 2 Z, n > 1, the following holds:
S(W;nx) < nS(W;x)
Proof. In section 3.7.
I may use the above results for analyzing selling and buying price for several lotteries
with given dependence structure. For illustration, suppose utility function is CRRA
and let's take a sequence of n > 1 identically distributed lotteries xi = ( x;1=2;x;1=2),
where x > 0 and i 2 f1;2;:::;ng. I am interested in nding a buying and selling price
for a sum of such lotteries: y =
Pn
i=1 xi. Such a sum is a new lottery which is not
identied until I specify the joint distribution between lotteries xi. Let's focus on two
benchmark cases of the joint distribution - one with maximal positive linear correlation
given marginals and one with maximal negative linear correlation given marginals. In
the rst case, lottery y takes the following form:
y = ( nx;1=2;nx;1=2)
and in the second case lottery y takes the following form:
y = ( x;1=2;x;1=2) if n odd
y = (0) if n even (3.19)
Applying previous results I obtain:






















S(W;xi) = nS(W;xi) for i 2 f1;2;:::;ng





i=1 xi) = B(W;xi) for i 2 f1;2;:::;ng
S(W;
Pn





i=1 xi) = 0
S(W;
Pn
i=1 xi) = 0
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3.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter for three dierent widely used risk attitudes classes I have attempted to
present characterizations in terms of:
 simple strategy
 buying/selling price for a lottery
 Pratt [4], Arrow [8] measures of risk aversion
I stated and proved in a systematic way equivalencies of these characterizations for
CARA, DARA and CRRA. These results can be useful both as technical help as well
as a useful guide in empirical work. Not all of these results are new. It is however
useful to put all of these results together and to oer a systematic proof of them. A
simple strategy concept is a novel way to formalize existing intuition. Although parts of
these results are well known in the literature, other parts turn out to be not suciently
acknowledged and one can nd statements in the literature which conrm it.
Another result in this chapter is an extension to Pratt [4] famous theorem on comparative
risk aversion. It incorporates buying price as an alternative way to compare risk aversion
across individuals. This result also might be useful both in theoretical and empirical
work.
In section "Additional results" an interesting fact about CRRA utility function class
is proved, namely that for any CRRA utility function except for the logarithm, which
can be ignored as a limiting case, there exists an equivalent utility function that is
homogeneous of some degree dierent than zero. Other results in this section develop
further analysis of buying and selling price properties such as concavity and additivity.
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3.7 Proofs
I will need a couple of lemmas.
Lemma 3.23. For any lottery x and any wealth level W, the following holds:
S[W;x   B(W;x)] = 0 (3.20)
S[W   B(W;x);x] = B(W;x) (3.21)
B[W + S(W;x);x] = S(W;x) (3.22)
Proof. First I prove (3.20). Dene y = x   B(W;x). Using equations (3.2) and (3.1)
U(W) = EU[W + (x   B(W;x))]
= EU[W + y]
= U[W + S(W;y)]
= U[W + S(W;x   B(W;x))]
And condition (3.20) follows. Now I prove (3.21). Dene V = W   B(W;x). Using
equations (3.2) and (3.1)
U(W) = EU[(W   B(W;x)) + x]
= EU[V + x]
= U[V + S(V;x)]
= U[W   B(W;x) + S(W   B(W;x);x)]
And condition (3.21) follows. Now I prove (3.22). Dene V = W + S(W;x). Using
equations (3.2) and (3.1)
EU(W + x) = U[W + S(W;x)]
= U(V )
= EU[V + x   B(V;x)]
= EU[W + S(W;x) + x   B(W + S(W;x);x)]
And so condition (3.22) is proved.
Lemma 3.24. For any non-degenerate lottery x and any wealth W such that buying
and selling price exist, S(W;x) and B(W;x) lie in the interval (min(x);E(x)). For a
degenerate lottery x, S(W;x) = B(W;x) = x.
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Proof. Notice rst, that for degenerate lottery x = x, equations (3.1) and (3.2) imply
the following:
W + S(W;x) = W + x
W + x   B(W;x) = W
And so S(W;x) = B(W;x) = x. From now on I will focus on a non-degenerate lottery x.
I will prove the lemma only for selling price. For buying price the proof is similar. For
simplicity I dene S  S(W;x). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose mini2f1;:::;ng xi 
S. Then:






 U(W + S)
with strict inequality for any xi 6= mini2f1;:::;ng xi. Since lottery x is non-degenerate
there exists at least one xi 6= mini2f1;:::;ng xi Hence
n X
i=1
piU(W + xi) > U(W + S)
So S cannot be the selling price - a contradiction.
Suppose now that S  E[x]. By strict Jensen's inequality:
EU[W + x] < U[W + E[x]]  U(W + S)
So S cannot be the selling price - a contradiction.












where ARA(W) =  
U00(W)
U0(W) is an absolute risk aversion coecient and p(W;h) is a
probability premium dened implicitly by:
p(W;h)U(W + h) + (1   p(W;h))U(W   h) = U(W) (3.24)
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Proof. Rewriting equation (3.24) by using second order Taylor expansion of U around
W, the following is obtained for small h:






















as was to be shown. If I set h = W, equation (3.25) immediately follows.
3.7.1 Proof of proposition 3.11
The proof will be split into two lemmas.
Lemma 3.26. Simple strategy of an individual is wealth invariant if and only if he
exhibits CARA.
Proof. Similar technique to that used in this proof was used in Aumann and Kurz [25].
If the decision maker's Bernoulli utility function is U, then wealth-invariant strategy can
be described alternatively by the following condition:
EU(W1 + x)  U(W1) () EU(W2 + x)  U(W2); 8W1;W2 (3.26)
(Necessity)
CARA utility functions take the following form U(x) = Ae ax + B, where A < 0,
a  0 and B are arbitrary constants (such that utility is strictly increasing). It is
straightforward to verify that CARA utility functions correspond to wealth-invariant
strategies.
(Suciency)
Given utility function U, consider two lotteries xi  (h;p(Wi;h); h;1 p(Wi;h)), where
Wi;h > 0; i 2 f1;2g, such that:
EU(Wi + xi) = U(Wi) (3.27)
Contrary to what is to be shown, assume that A(W1) > A(W2), where A(W) is absolute
risk aversion function. By lemma 3.25 equation (3.23), for h suciently small I know
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that p(W1;h) > p(W2;h). Let q be between the two probability premiums: p(W1;h) >
q > p(W2;h). I dene another lottery y  (h;q; h;1 q). By denition of a probability
premium utility function U "rejects" lottery y at wealth W1 and "accepts" it at wealth
W2, which contradicts wealth invariance.
Lemma 3.27. Given any W1 and W2, the following holds:
B(W1;x) = S(W2;x) 8W1;W2 () the strategy is wealth   invariant
where B and S are buying and selling price function, respectively14.
Proof. First step) First, I will prove that S is independent of W i the strategy is wealth-
invariant.
(Neccessity)
If the strategy is wealth invariant then by condition (3.26) it follows that:
EU(W1 + x) = U(W1) () EU(W2 + x) = U(W2); 8W1;W2 (3.28)
Let's denote S(Wi;x) = Si i 2 f1;2g and assume W1 6= W2. From the denition of
selling price:
EU(W1 + x) = U(W1 + S1)
Let's dene V1 = W1 + S1, V2 = W2 + S2 and y = x   S1. By equation (3.28) I know
that:
EU(V1 + y) = U(V1) () EU(V2 + y) = U(V2)
Hence by substituting y = x S1 and V2 = W2+S2 into the RHS of the above condition:
EU(W2 + S2 + x   S1) = U(W2 + S2)
And by denition of S2 I know that S1 has to be equal to S2: S(W1;x) = S(W2;x)
(Suciency)
Suppose that the strategy is not wealth-invariant. Then:
9W1;W2;x : EU(W1 + x)  U(W1) and EU(W2 + x) < U(W2);
Notice that by strict monotonicity of U it follows that S(W1;x)  0 and S(W2;x) < 0
which contradicts the fact that S is wealth-invariant.
Second step) Now it is sucient to prove that S is equal to B i S is independent of W.
(Necessity)
14Notice that the condition on the left-hand side of the above equivalence is the same as condition iii.
in the statement of proposition 3.11.
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If S is independent of W then S(W;x) = S(W0;x) for any W and W0. Take W0 =
W  B(W;x) and any W. Then from lemma 3.23 equation (3.21) I have that: B(W;x) =
S(W   B(W;x);x). And from the fact that S is independent of wealth, I obtain
S(W;x) = B(W;x). Since W was arbitrary B is also wealth independent and necessity
is proved.
(Suciency)
Take any W and x it. Suppose S(W0;x) = B(W;x) for any W0. Then obviously S has
to be independent of wealth. This nishes the proof.
Taken together lemma 3.26 and lemma 3.27 establish proposition 3.11.
3.7.2 Proof of proposition 3.12
The proof is split into three parts. The rst part is the following.
Lemma 3.28. If simple strategy of an individual is of "wealthier-accept more" type then
he exhibits DARA.
Proof. I will prove the contrapositive of the above statement. Suppose A(W1)  A(W2)
for any W1 < W2. If A(W1) = A(W2) then by proposition 3.11 simple strategy is wealth-
invariant so it cannot be of "wealthier-accept more" type. Suppose then that A(W1) <
A(W2) for some given W1 < W2. Consider two lotteries: xi = (h;p(Wi;h); h;1  
p(Wi;h)), i = f1;2g such that:
EU(Wi + xi) = U(Wi)
Then by lemma 3.25, p(W1;h) < p(W2) for h small enough. I construct another lottery
y = (h;q; h;1 q) such that p(W1;h) < q < p(W2). Then by construction U "rejects"
lottery y at wealth level W2 and "accepts" it at wealth level W1 which means that the
strategy cannot be of "wealthier-accept more" type.
The second part of the proof consists of three results.
The following result is corollary to Pratt [4] theorem. The proof is due to LeRoy and
Werner [26].
Corollary 3.29. For a strictly increasing and twice dierentiable utility function U with
continuous second derivative, the following holds:
 S(W;x) is increasing/constant/decreasing in W for every x i A(W) is decreas-
ing/constant/increasing in W
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where A(W) denotes absolute risk aversion as a function of W.
Proof. I will prove only increasing S case. The rest is similar. Given a utility function
U1(W), dene another utility function U2(W) = U1(W + ), where   0. I can then
apply Pratt [4] theorem: S1(W;x) < S2(W;x) = S1(W +;x) , A1(W) > A2(W) =
A1(W + ). Since  was arbitrary the corollary is proved.
Lemma 3.30. If utility function is of DARA type, then the following holds:
B(W;x) > 0 () B(W;x) < S(W;x)
Proof. Using equation (3.21) of lemma 3.23 and corollary 3.29 to Pratt [4] theorem, the
following is obtained:
0 < B(W;x) = S[W   B(W;x);x] < S(W;x)
Lemma 3.31. For a strictly increasing and twice dierentiable utility function U() with
continuous second derivative, the following holds:
 B(W;x) is increasing/constant/decreasing in W for every x i A(W) is decreas-
ing/constant/increasing in W
where A(W) denotes absolute risk aversion as a function of W.
Proof. By corollary 3.29, it suces to show the following:
 S(W;x) is increasing/constant/decreasing in W for any x i B(W;x) is increas-
ing/constant/decreasing in W for any x.
I will show only the "increasing part". The rest is similar.
()) The proof is by contradiction. Take x such that, if W1 < W2 then B(W1;x) 
B(W2;x). Fix this x. Since S(W;x) is increasing in W for any x, I have:
S[W2;x   B(W1;x)] > S[W1;x   B(W1;x)] = S[W2;x   B(W2;x)] = 0 (3.29)
where I made use of lemma 3.23 equation (3.20). By lemma 3.36, equation (3.38), I
obtain from above::
S(W2   B(W1;x);x)   B(W1;x) > S(W2   B(W2;x);x)   B(W2;x)
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And hence after rearranging and using the assumption:
0  B(W1;x)   B(W2;x)
< S(W2   B(W1;x);x)   S(W2   B(W2;x);x)
 0
Which is a contradiction and hence the "if" part of the lemma is proved.
(() Again by contradiction. Take x such that, if W1 < W2 then S(W1;x)  S(W2;x).
Fix this x. By lemma 3.23 equation (3.21) I have:
B(W1;x) = S(W1   B(W1;x);x)
 S(W2   B(W1;x);x)
 S(W2   B(W2;x);x) = B(W2;x)
where the rst inequality follows from our assumption and second inequality follows
from the fact that B(W;x) is increasing in W for any x. Hence B(W1;x)  B(W2;x) -
a contradiction.
Combining corollary 3.29 and lemmas 3.30 and 3.31, it is established that when utility
is DARA then buying and selling price are increasing in W and that
B(W;x) > 0 () B(W;x) < S(W;x)
The third step in proving proposition 3.12 is the following:
Lemma 3.32. If selling price is increasing in W then strategy is of "wealthier-accept
more" type.
Proof. Let's focus on lotteries the acceptance of which, given preferences, depends on
wealth level. That is there exists two dierent wealth levels W1;W2 such that S(W1;x) <
0 (reject) and S(W2;x) > 0 (accept). Since S is increasing in W, it must be that
W1 < W2.
3.7.3 Proof of proposition 3.13
Now I prove proposition 3.13. The proof is split into three lemmas.
Lemma 3.33. Simple strategy of an individual is scale invariant if and only if he exhibits
CRRA.
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CRRA. If the decision maker's Bernoulli utility function is U, then homogeneous strat-
egy can be described alternatively by the following condition:
EU(W + x)  U(W) () EU(W + x)  U(W); 8 > 0 (3.30)
(Necessity)
All CRRA utility functions belong to the following family: U(x) = Axa + B, where
A > 0, 1 6= a  0 and B are arbitrary constants (such that utility is strictly increasing)
and U(x) = Alogx + B for a = 1, where A  0 and B are arbitrary constants. It
is easy to verify that indeed, CRRA class of utility functions represents homogeneous
strategies.
(Suciency)
Given utility function U, consider lottery x  (Wh;p(W;h); Wh;1   p(W;h)), where
W;h > 0, such that:
EU(W + x) = U(W) (3.31)
Contrary to what is to be shown, assume that R(W) > R(W), for  > 0 and  6= 1.
Dene x0  (Wh;p(W;h); Wh;1   p(W;h)), such that:
EU(W + x0) = U(W) (3.32)
For h suciently small, by proposition 3.25 equation (3.25), I know that: p(W;h) >
p(W;h). Therefore, I can nd q such that: p(W;h) > q > p(W;h). Dene y 
(Wh;q; Wh;(1   q)).
By equation (3.32), since p(W;h) > q:
EU(W + x) < U(W)
By equation (3.31), and since q > p(W;h), I have:
EU(W + y) > U(W)
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3.34. Given any  > 0, the following holds:
S(W;x) = S(W;x)
B(W;x) = B(W;x)
() strategy is homogeneous:
where B and S are buying and selling price function, respectively.
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Proof. (Necessity)
I will prove it only for selling price S. For buying price proof is similar. To avoid heavy
notation, I dene S  S(W;x) and S  S(W;x). If the decision maker's Bernoulli
utility function is U, then scale-invariant strategy can be described alternatively by the
following condition:
EU(W + x) = U(W) () EU(W + x) = U(W); 8 > 0 (3.33)
By denition of S:
EU(W + x) = U(W + S)
Dene V  W + 1
S and y  x   1
S. Then I can rewrite the above equation as:
EU(V + y) = U(V )
By condition (3.33), I have:
EU(V + y) = U(V ) () EU(V + y) = U(V ); 8 > 0
And hence




So, by denition of S, it has to be that: 1
S = S or by returning to the original notation:
S(W;x) = S(W;x); 8 > 0
(Suciency)
Suppose the strategy is not homogeneous. Then there exists  > 0, such that:
EU(W + x)  U(W) and EU(W + x) < U(W) (3.34)
It follows that S(W;x)  0 and S(W;x) < 0, by strict monotonicity of U and the
fact that  is positive. Hence it is not possible that this , S(W;x) = S(W;x). A
contradiction.
Lemma 3.35. Simple strategy is scale-invariant if and only if buying and selling return
prices for any multiplicative lottery are independent from wealth and equal i.e.
b(W;h) = s(W;h) = C; 8W (3.35)
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where  is relative risk aversion coecient and C takes real values and depends only
on . Additionally,
b(W;h) = b(W;h) (3.36)
s(W;h) = s(W;h) (3.37)
Proof. If a strategy is scale-invariant, it is easy to see from the denitions of buying and
selling return prices (3.11) and (3.10), that all the conditions of b(W;h) and s(W;h)
above are satised. Similarly in the other direction, it is easy to see that if the con-
ditions above are satised, the strategy must be scale-invariant due to the nature of
multiplicative gambles and the way they are handled in conditions (3.11) and (3.10)
dening buying and selling return prices.
3.7.4 Proof of proposition 3.14
I will rst prove two additional lemmas and then the proposition. The rst proposition
states that buying price exhibits the so called delta property whereas selling price in
general does not.
Lemma 3.36. For any lottery x and any wealth level W and for  2 R, the following
holds:
S(W;x + ) = S(W + ;x) +  (3.38)
B(W;x + ) = B(W;x) +  (3.39)
Proof. From the denition of selling price:
EU(W + x + ) = U[W + S(W;x + )]
= U[W +  + S(W + ;x)]
And hence equation (3.38) holds. From the denition of buying price:
U(W) = EU[W + (x + )   B(W;x + )]
= EU[W + x   B(W;x)]
And hence equation (3.39) holds.
A function F(W;x) exhibits delta property if F(W;x + ) = F(W;x) +  for  2 R.
Thus, the buying price exhibits delta property, while selling price in general does not -
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see equations (3.38) and (3.39) above. There is however a special class of utility functions
for which selling price exhibits the delta property, namely the class of constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA). Notice from equation (3.38), that selling price would obey the
delta property if only S(W +;x) = S(W;x) for  2 R. That means that selling price
would be independent of wealth level W. And indeed, as could easily be checked, selling
price for CARA utility is independent of wealth. In fact, the stronger result by Raia
[2] holds- CARA utility is equivalent to selling price exhibiting the delta property.
Lemma 3.37. For dierentiable DARA utility functions, given any non-degenerate lot-





Proof. From the denition of buying, selling price and the fact that they are both




EU0(W + x   B(W;x))   U0(W)
EU0(W + x   B(W;x))
> 0
The result follows.
Proposition 3.38. For two dierent utility functions U1() and U2() with decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA), any wealth level W and any non-degenerate random
variable x with bounded values, I dene corresponding selling and buying prices S1(W;x),
B1(W;x) and S2(W;x), B2(W;x). The following equivalence holds:
8W 8x : 9  > 0 jxij <  8i 2 f1;:::;ng
S1(W;x) > S2(W;x) () B1(W;x) > B2(W;x)
Proof. ()) By contradiction. Fix x with bounded values and W for which the following
holds: B1(W;x)  B2(W;x). By lemma 3.23 equation (3.21), I obtain:
S1(W   B1(W;x);x)  S2(W   B2(W;x);x)
 S2(W   B1(W;x);x)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that S2 is increasing in the rst ar-
gument and B1(W;x)  B2(W;x). This is a contradiction since I have found V =
W   B1(W;x) and x for which S1(V;x)  S2(V;x). Thus the rst part of the proposi-
tion is proved.
(() By contradiction. Suppose S1(V;x)  S2(V;x) for some V and some x with bounded
values. Take lottery y : y = x. Take wealth level W : V = W   B1(W;x). Such wealth
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level exists for any V 2 R. To prove this, I dene a function W : R ! R taking values
V (W) = W   B1(W;x). This function is a bijection and takes values in the whole real
line ( 1;+1). First, by the fact that lottery x has bounded values I know by lemma
3.25 that B1(W;x) is also bounded. On the other hand W is not bounded. Hence,
V (W) is also not bounded. Second, by lemma 3.37, I know that
@B1(W;x)
@W < 1 and thus
V 0(W) > 0. Therefore, V (W) is both surjection and injection and hence bijection. This
proves that for any V 2 R, there exists a unique W such that V = W   B1(W;x).
If this holds for any V , then it holds for some V such that given some x, the follow-
ing holds S1(V;x)  S2(V;x). I will now show that for lottery y and wealth level W,
B1(W;y)  B2(W;y). In fact, using lemma 3.23 equation (3.21):
B1(W;y) = B1(W;x)
= S1(W   B1(W;x);x)
= S1(V;x)
 S2(V;x)
= S2(W   B1(W;x);x)
< S2(W   B2(W;x);x)
= B2(W;x) = B2(W;y)
where the last inequality holds due to the fact that B1(W;x) > B2(W;x) for all W and
for all x with bounded values and S2 is increasing in the rst argument. A contradiction.
Hence the proposition is proved.
3.7.5 Proof of proposition 3.20
The proof is split into two lemmas.
Lemma 3.39. For any W1 6= W2 and for all  2 (0;1) and any non-degenerate lottery
x, the following holds for constant relative risk aversion utility function:
S(W1 + (1   )W2;x) > S(W1;x) + (1   )S(W2;x)
B(W1 + (1   )W2;x) > B(W1;x) + (1   )B(W2;x)
provided that both sides are well dened.
Proof. I will show that for all  2 (0;1) and for all W1 6= W2, the following holds:
S(W1 + (1   )W2;x) > S(W1;x) + (1   )S(W2;x)
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I dene Si = S(Wi;x), where i = 1;2. By the property of homogeneity the following
follows from the denition:
EU

W1 + (1   )W2 + x



























W1 + (1   )W2 + x
(W1 + S1) + (1   )(W2 + S2)





(W1   B1) + (1   )(W2   B2) + x
W1 + (1   )W2

> 1




W1   B1 + x
W1

+ (1   )EU







W1   B1 + x
W1
+ (1   )





(W1   B1) + (1   )(W2   B2) + x
W1 + (1   )W2

Lemma 3.40. For CRRA utility function, the following holds 8 2 (0;1)
S(W;x) + S((1   )W;y) < S(W;x + y)
B(W;x) + B((1   )W;y) < B(W;x + y)
provided that both sides are well dened.
Proof. Let's start with the selling price. Dene S1 = S(W;x) and S2 = S((1 )W;y).
The proof is similar to the proof of concavity of S and B in W. Dene  = W+S1
W+S1+S2.
Note that 1    =
(1 )W






+ (1   )EU

(1   )W + y







+ (1   )
(1   )W + y




W + x + y
W + S1 + S2

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Similarly with the buying price. Dene B1 = B(W;x) and B2 = B((1   )W;y).
1 = EU

W + x   B1
W

+ (1   )EU






W + x + y   B1   B2
W

3.7.6 Proof of propositions 3.21 and 3.22
Notice that for a concave function f, the following holds: f(W + nx) < nf(W + x).

















[U(W + nxi   B(W;nx))   U(W)]
This implies that B(W;nx) < nB(W;x).
Now I prove proposition 3.22. According to proposition 3.20, for CRRA utility function
and given that n > 0, I have: S(nW;nx) = nS(W;x). And since CRRA functions
belong to the class of DARA functions, I know that S is increasing in W. Hence
S(W;nx) < S(nW;nx) = nS(W;x).
3.8 Appendix
In section 3.3 I introduced two criteria for accepting monetary gamble x:
a. wealth from accepting x should increase on average in nominal terms
b. return from x should be positive on average
I claimed that these two criteria are equivalent to the following:
accept x () Ea(W + x)  W () Ea(x)  0
accept h () W  Eg(h)  W () Eg(h)  1
where h = 1 + x
W , and W > L(x).
I will explain it on the basis of two simple lotteries. Let x = (x;p;y;1   p) and h =
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/14404Chapter 3. Risk attitudes - characterization results 68
(h;q;k;1   q). Suppose the decision maker with initial wealth W accepts a sequence of
n independent gambles of the form x
n. Suppose that x
n occurs i times in the sequence.
Then his nal wealth will be: W + i
nx+ n i
n y. By the law of large numbers as n becomes
large, i
n tends to p, so that nal wealth may be written as:
W + [px + (1   p)y] = W + Eax
Now suppose that the decision maker with initial wealth W accepts a sequence of n
independent multiplicative gambles of the form (h)
1
n. Suppose that h
1
n occurs i times




n . By the law of large numbers
as n becomes large, i
n tends to q, so that nal wealth may be written as:
Whqk1 q = W  Egh




Gambles with prices, operational
measure of riskiness and buying
and selling price for risky lotteries
Abstract
In this chapter I analyze the operational measure of riskiness dened by Foster and
Hart [5]. I give simple intuition behind their main result. Then I extend the concept
of riskiness measure in two respects - I dene a generalized riskiness measure based on
decreasing absolute risk aversion utility function. I derive necessary and sucient con-
ditions for existence of such measure for DARA and CRRA class of utility functions.
In addition, I show the way how to compare riskiness of gambles with negative expec-
tation or with nonnegative outcomes only. To this end I use properties of buying and
selling price for a lottery and their relations to riskiness measure. In particular, I show
how buying and selling price for a lottery concepts may be used complementary to the
concept of riskiness measure.
Keywords: operational measure of riskiness, extended measure of riskiness
69
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/14404Chapter 4. Generalized measure of riskiness 70
4.1 Introduction
In economics there is more consensus over how to dene risk aversion than how to dene
risk. Aumann and Serrano [24] used this startling matter of fact to dene a concept
of risk derived from risk aversion, i.e. risk is what risk averters hate. This ingenious
approach and nice axiomatic treatment led to dening economic index of riskiness. Since
it looked like the index was measured in dollars but there was no theoretical support
for this claim at the time, Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart started to work on giving the
index operational interpretation. This plan did not succeed but instead Foster and Hart
[5] came up with another way to measure riskiness which bears a lot of similarity to
Aumann and Serrano [24] index and has a nice operational interpretation. They dene
measure of riskiness for a gamble as an amount of initial wealth below which the de-
cision maker should reject the gamble if he wishes to guarantee no-bankruptcy making
consistent choices in the long run1. In this paper I want to provide simple intuition
behind Foster and Hart [5] measure of riskiness. In particular, I want to show why their
result holds and which assumptions are crucial for that. I will discuss assumptions be-
hind the model, in particular the assumption of homogeneous simple strategies. Simple
strategies are strategies whether to accept a given gamble or not taking into account
only current wealth level and the gamble in question. In a dynamic setting it corre-
sponds to Markov stationary strategy concept. Simple strategies are homogeneous if
they are scale-invariant - the decision whether to accept a gamble at a given wealth level
should not change when both the gamble outcomes and wealth level are rescaled by some
positive factor. I will show that in the expected utility framework this assumption is
equivalent to constant relative risk aversion utility function representing the individual's
preferences. I will argue that the assumption of scale-invariant simple strategies is cru-
cial for the main result of Foster and Hart [5] even though the statement of alternative
result without this assumption seems similar in mathematical terms. I will try to show
that the assumption of scale-invariant simple strategies makes the result of Foster and
Hart [5] particularly strong by imposing strong consistency requirements.
Another restriction of the model by Foster and Hart [5] is necessary for the existence of
the riskiness measure. Gambles are assumed to have positive expectation and negative
outcomes with positive probability. To be precise this assumption is not necessary for
existence of the riskiness measure as the authors argue that the riskiness measure can
be extended so that all gambles with non-positive expectation have riskiness equal to
innity and all gambles with no losses get zero riskiness. However the fact is that only
gambles satisfying the assumption can be compared in terms of their riskiness and gam-
bles which do not satisfy this assumption cannot. This is to say that the assumption
1If this statement is not clear at this point, it will be claried later on when the exact formulation
and the nature of the consistency requirements are outlined.
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/14404Chapter 4. Generalized measure of riskiness 71
restricts the set of gambles to those for which riskiness measure is meaningful. I want to
show the way to compare riskiness of the gambles which do not satisfy this assumption.
For this purpose I will link the concept of riskiness measure with the concept of buying
and selling price for a lottery as dened by Raia [2]. I will analyze riskiness measure
for gambles with prices. The advantage of this approach is that the riskiness measure in
this case is well dened even if it is not well dened for gambles without prices. A couple
of theoretical results will make it clear in what sense measuring riskiness for gambles
without prices can sometimes be inferred from the riskiness measure for gambles with
prices.
The riskiness measure of Foster and Hart [5] can be linked to expected utility maximiza-
tion. It is rather straightforward to see from the denition2 that the riskiness measure
of a gamble is equal to the value of initial wealth for which the logarithmic utility max-
imizer is indierent between taking the lottery and not taking the lottery. Logarithmic
utility function is a member of constant relative risk aversion class of utility functions.
I extend the denition of the riskiness measure as follows - given some utility function
and a gamble, the riskiness measure is the value of wealth for which the decision maker
whose preferences are represented by this utility function is indierent between taking
and not taking the gamble. For the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion and the
narrower case of constant relative risk aversion I show what are the necessary and suf-
cient conditions for existence of such riskiness measure. Obviously for functions other
than logarithm it is not necessarily the case that the simple strategy corresponding to
such utility function guarantees no-bankruptcy so strictly speaking to allow other utility
functions is not really an extension of the riskiness measure by Foster and Hart [5].
However, it turns out that for CRRA utility functions the extended riskiness measure is
increasing in relative risk aversion coecient. It means that for utility functions with rel-
ative risk aversion coecient higher that 1 (the limiting case equivalent to logarithm),
the extended riskiness measure in fact guarantees no-bankruptcy. Since these utility
functions "reject" more than logarithmic utility function, it is the case that the riskiness
measure of Foster and Hart [5] is the lowest and hence least restrictive among all risk-
iness measures which guarantee no-bankruptcy. This result appears already in Foster
and Hart [5] but in an implicit form and therefore I state it in the paper explicitly.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2 I introduce the model and its assump-
tions and in particular I introduce the concepts of buying and selling price for a lottery
and the riskiness measure of Foster and Hart [5]. In section 4.3 I show some intuition
behind the riskiness measure. In section 4.4 I extend the denition of the riskiness mea-
sure and give the necessary and sucient conditions for existence of such measure. In
section 4.5 I show in what relation to each other buying and selling price for a lottery
and the extended riskiness measure are. I also discuss how this relation can be helpful
2See equation (4.4).
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in comparing riskiness measures of gambles that do not have positive expectation and
negative outcomes. In section 4.6 I demonstrate equivalence between expected utility
decision making, riskiness measure based decision making and buying/selling price based
decision making. Finally, I conclude. Most of the results which I refer to in the paper
and which have been proved in another paper have been placed in the appendix at the
end.
4.2 The model
Below I dene the class of utility functions and the space of lotteries which I will focus
on in this paper.
Assumption 4.1. Preferences obey expected utility axioms. Bernoulli utility function
U : R ! R is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Denition 4.2. A lottery x is a real- and nite-valued random variable with nite
support. The space of all lotteries will be denoted X. I dene the maximal loss of
lottery x as: min(x) = minsupp(x).
The typical lottery will be denoted as x  (x1;p1;:::;xn;pn), where xi 2 R i 2 f1;2;:::;ng
are outcomes and pi 2 [0;1] i 2 f1;2;:::;ng are the corresponding probabilities. Out-
comes should be interpreted here as monetary values. Although most of results that
follow are true for more general lotteries, the nite support assumption is sucient for
the purposes of this paper. Now I dene buying and selling price for a lottery given
wealth level along the lines of Raia [2]. To avoid repetitions, I will henceforth skip
statements of the form: "Given utility function U satisfying assumption 4.1, any lottery
x and wealth W...".
4.2.1 Buying and selling price for a lottery
Here and in the next sections I introduce the key concepts of the paper.
Denition 4.3. I dene selling price and buying price for a lottery x at wealth W as
functions denoted, respectively, S(W;x) and B(W;x). Provided that they exist, values
of these functions will be determined by the following equations:
EU[W + x] = U[W + S(W;x)] (4.1)
EU[W + x   B(W;x)] = U(W) (4.2)
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If utility function is dened over the whole real line as is the case for constant absolute
risk aversion, buying and selling price as functions of wealth exists for any wealth level
by assumption 4.1. If the domain of utility function is restricted to a part of real line as
is the case of constant relative risk aversion utility function analyzed here, the domain
of buying and selling price for a lottery is also restricted. I will focus mostly on the case
of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function normalized conveniently3 so






1  ; 0 <  < 1; x  0
logx;  = 1; x > 0
x1  1














The proposition below establishes the domain and the range of selling and buying price
for a lottery if the utility function takes the above form. The statement and the proof
is due to Lewandowski [22].
Proposition 4.4 (CRRA2). Given the class of CRRA utility function used in the section
the following holds for any non-degenerate lottery x: for   1
 limW!0 B(W;x) = min(x)
 limW! min(x) S(W;x) = min(x)
Dene WL(x) = U 1[EU( min(x) + x)]. For 0 <  < 1
 limW!WL(x) B(W;x) = WL(x) + min(x),
 limW! min(x) S(W;x) = WL(x) + min(x)
Additionally,





As for the intuition behind selling and buying price for the lottery, in economic terms,
given an individual with initial wealth W whose preferences are represented by utility
function U(), S(W;x) is the minimal amount of money which he demands for giving
3Normalization is done without loss of generality since cardinal utility function is unique only up to
ane transformation. That means that I can choose the slope and the shifting constant in a given point
without changing the Pratt [4] risk attitudes characteristics.
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up lottery x. Similarly, B(W;x) is the maximal amount of money which he is willing to
pay in order to play lottery x.
Buying and selling price exhibit certain properties, many of which are enumerated in
the appendix. Proofs of these properties may be found in Lewandowski [15]. I will make
use of these properties when I establish connections between buying and selling price
and riskiness measure.
4.2.2 Riskiness measure
Foster and Hart [5] dene operational measure of riskiness as follows. The initial wealth
is W1 > 0. At every period t = 1;2;:::, the decision maker with wealth Wt is oered a
gamble xt. He may accept or reject the gamble. His wealth next period is Wt+1 = Wt+xt
if he accepts and Wt+1 = Wt if he rejects. Simple strategy of the decision maker whether
to accept gamble xt at time t or not is assumed to be stationary Markov strategy
- it depends only on the gamble xt and current wealth level Wt. Simple strategy is
homogeneous or scale-invariant if "accept x at W" implies "accept x at W", for
any  > 0. For characterization results concerning simple strategies and in particular
homogeneous simple strategies consult Lewandowski [15]. If borrowing is not allowed,
bankruptcy occurs when wealth converges to zero as time goes to innity. A given
strategy s yields no-bankruptcy for the process (xt)t=1;2;::: and the initial wealth W1
if probability of bankruptcy is zero, i.e. P[limt!1 Wt = 0] = 0. Strategy guarantees
no-bankruptcy if it yields no-bankruptcy for every process (xt)t=1;2;::: and every initial
wealth level W1. The technical assumptions state that gambles are assumed to be nite-
valued, with nite support and such that E[x] > 0 and P[x < 0] > 0, where P[E]
denotes a probability of an event E (positive expected value and losses are possible).
The stochastic process (xt)t=1;2;::: is assumed to be nitely generated.
The main theorem of Foster and Hart [5] states the following.
Theorem 4.5 (Foster and Hart [5]). For every gamble x there exists a unique real
number RFH(x) > 0 such that: a homogeneous strategy s guarantees no-bankruptcy if
and only if for every gamble x and wealth W > 0,
W < RFH(x) ) s rejects x at W
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Foster and Hart [5] call RFH(x) the measure of riskiness of x.
As I mentioned in the introduction, there is a link between the riskiness measure and
expected utility maximizing individuals. Consider an expected-utility maximizer with
utility function U:
accept x at W () EU(W + x)  U(W) (4.5)
Notice that for logarithmic utility function I can rewrite condition on the RHS of (4.5)










It is clear that the index RFH(x) has the property that the logarithmic utility rejects x
if W < RFH(x) and accepts x if W  RFH(x). Hence by the theorem above logarithmic
utility represents a strategy that is among those which guarantee bankruptcy. In the
next section I will provide further intuition behind the riskiness measure and discuss
assumptions underlying it.
4.3 Riskiness measure - its assumptions and intuition be-
hind
Notice that simple strategies in the theorem are assumed to be homogeneous. It turns
out as proved in Lewandowski [15] that in expected utility setting homogeneous simple
strategy is equivalent to utility function being of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
type. Within this class logarithmic utility function guarantees no bankruptcy as shown
above. Even more is true as will be shown in the next section - in CRRA class all
utility functions with relative risk aversion coecient   1 guarantee no-bankruptcy.
Logarithmic utility function is the least restrictive (rejects the least) among all CRRA
utility functions that guarantee no-bankruptcy4. To understand the intuition behind
this result is quite simple. Suppose CRRA utility function is normalized conveniently





 1 for   1
A() >  1 for 0 <  < 1
Within CRRA class, logarithmic function is a function with the smallest relative risk
aversion among those which "assign"  1 index to bankruptcy x = 0. Intuitively, if
utility value for bankruptcy is nite as is the case for 0 <  < 1 then for any initial
4It is also independently shown in Foster and Hart [5].
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wealth W it is possible to construct a sequence of gambles such that the decision maker
who makes decisions represented by this utility function goes bankrupt with positive
probability. Consider a decision maker whose decisions are represented by a CRRA
utility function U(x) for which limx!0 U(x) = A >  1. Suppose his initial wealth level
is W > 0. I construct a gamble ( W;p;M;1   p), 1 > p > 0 ( W with probability





 0. It is possible
to construct such a gamble because CRRA utility function is unbounded above. Hence
the decision maker will accept this gamble at wealth level W. In one step only the
probability that this decision maker goes bankrupt (his wealth is zero) is p > 0. As
long as limx!0 U(x) = A >  1, it is possible to construct gambles that make an
individual whose preferences are represented by U(x) bankrupt in one step with positive
probability.
The situation is dierent for   1. Here limx!0 U(x) =  inf. An individual with
initial wealth W whose preferences are represented by such utility function U will never
accept a nite-valued gamble that makes him bankrupt with positive probability. It
follows that there does not exists a nite sequence of gambles that such individual would
accept and which would make him bankrupt with positive probability. What about
the innite sequence of gambles? Here is a useful illustration: Suppose the decision
maker has initial wealth W > 0 and his preferences can represented by logarithmic
utility function. Suppose further that he is oered an innite sequence of multiplicative







, where  > 0. Notice rst that the




1  = log1. Assume that the gambles in this innite sequence are perfectly
positively correlated.5 That means that after accepting n such gambles the decision







. Let's write the "next"








. Notice that as
n goes to innity wealth tends to zero with positive probability . However, in order to
achieve this the gambles in the sequence become innite valued: limn!1 W2
n 
1  = 1
The above illustration shows that in case of logarithmic utility function 6, one needs
innite-valued gambles so that accepting these gambles leads to bankruptcy with positive
probability and yet they are accepted.
It is worth noting that Foster and Hart [5] have also another theorem in which they
relax the assumption of homogeneous simple strategies. It seems however that this
theorem is much weaker than the one with homogeneous simple strategies. It still
says that to guarantee no-bankruptcy it is necessary to reject gamble x at wealth level
W if W < RFH(x). This time however it is required only if wealth is close to zero
already. If wealth is higher other strategies are sucient such as: reject x at wealth W
5For all other correlation the argument works even better.
6Actually, for all CRRA functions with   1.
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if W < min(x) + , for  > 0 and small.
Apart from homogeneity assumption, the riskiness measure is dened only for gambles
with positive expectation and possible losses. In the subsequent sections I will show a
way to infer something about the riskiness of a gamble even if the gamble does not allow
losses or/and has non-positive expectation.
4.4 Extended riskiness measure
In this section I dene an extended riskiness measure and analyze conditions which are
necessary and sucient for existence of such measure. I discuss rst the more general
case of decreasing absolute risk aversion and then I focus on a subset of this, namely
constant relative risk aversion.
4.4.1 Existence, uniqueness and no-bankruptcy for DARA
I focus on decreasing absolute risk aversion class of utility functions. Following Yaari
[27] I dene the acceptance set Ax  fW : EU(W + x) > U(W)g of wealth levels for
which an individual with preferences represented by utility function U facing the lottery
x strictly prefers to accept this lottery. Dybvig and Lippman [28] proved the following
result:
Theorem 4.6 (Dybvig and Lippman [28]). Let U be a strictly increasing concave utility
function with continuous second derivative. Then absolute risk aversion A is decreasing
if and only if for each gamble x, Ax is an interval of the form (x;+1), where  1 
x  +1.
The theorem is adjusted for the purposes of this paper. Dene function (W) =
EU(W + x)   U(W). Below I present my proof of this result as it is shorter and
more straightforward than the original.
Proof. Notice that since U is continuous, function  is continuous as well. Hence exactly
one of the three possibilities can occur:
 (W) > 0; 8W, in which case Ax = ( 1;+1)
 (W) < 0; 8W, in which case Ax = (+1;+1)
 function  crosses zero axis
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In the last case I will show that function  crosses zero axis exactly once. Suppose
function  crosses zero axis at W, i.e. (W) = 0. From the denition of selling price,
it is clear that S(W;x) = 0. Using the corollary 4.28 to Pratt [4] theorem which can be
found in the appendix, since for DARA utility S is increasing in W, it must be that for
W > W, S(W;x) > 0 and for W < W, S(W;x) < 0. And hence there can be exactly
one such W for which function  crosses zero axis.
The theorem above makes it clear that DARA utility means that wealthier people accept
more gambles. It also shows that if there exists number W for which (W) = 0, it
must necessarily be unique. Therefore, it makes sense to dene, whenever it exists,
R(x) = W as an extended riskiness measure. There are two conditions which are
necessary for existence of an extended riskiness measure for all functions which are
concave and strictly increasing.
Proposition 4.7. For all utility functions which are concave and strictly increasing and
given a lottery x, the following are necessary conditions for existence of R(x):
a. E[x] > 0
b. P[x < 0] > 0
Proof. To see that these two are the necessary conditions for existence of an extended
riskiness measure, note that if E[x]  0, then by Jensen's inequality U(R(x)) = EU(R(x)+
x) < U[R(x) + E(x)]  U(R(x)), which is a contradiction. If on the other hand losses
are not possible and P[x < 0] = 0 then (W) > 0; 8W so that R(x) does not exist.
Suppose now that the outcome space is restricted to strictly positive real numbers, the
intuition being that zero represents bankruptcy or the worst possible outcome. In this
case the riskiness measure, if it exists, can take values in the interval (L(x); +1) , where
L(x) is dened as the maximal loss of x and is equal to  min(x). The following are the
necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of an extended riskiness measure:
Proposition 4.8. Given DARA utility function U : (0;+1) ! R and a lottery x
satisfying conditions a. and b. stated above, the necessary and sucient conditions for
R(x) > L(x) to exist are:
 limW!L(x)+ (W) < 0
 limW!+1 (W)  0
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Proof. Notice rst that due to condition b. above, L(x) > 0. Therefore expression
limW!L(x)+ (W) from the rst condition above is well dened. Now let's write the
denitions of selling price for two wealth levels W and V :
EU(V + x)   U[V + S(V;x)] = 0
EU(W + x)   U[W + S(W;x)] = 0
If V > W and utility is DARA then by corollary 4.28 to Pratt [4] theorem I have:
EU(V + x)   U[V + S(W;x)] > 0
EU(W + x)   U[W + S(V;x)] < 0
If R(x) = W then S(W;x) = 0 and (V ) > 0 and if R(x) = V , then S(V;x) = 0 and
(W) < 0. That means that R(x) > L(x) exists, if limW!L(x)+ (W) < 0.
The second condition has to be satised due to the same reasons for which the proof of
theorem 4.6 is true. Since extended riskiness measure is unique and function  has to
be increasing when evaluated at the extended riskiness measure, the value of function 
at wealth going to innity has to be not less than zero.
The above two conditions which are both necessary and sucient for existence of an
extended riskiness measure are not very informative for the general case of decreasing
absolute risk aversion. Therefore I will provide below a pair of more informative con-
ditions, the dierence being that these conditions are sucient but not necessary for
existence of an extended measure of riskiness:
 limx!0+ U(x) =  1
 limx!+1 A(x) = 0
where A(x) is absolute risk aversion function evaluated at x. To see that these con-
ditions are sucient for existence of an extended measure of riskiness, observe that if
limx!0+ U(x) =  1 and P[x < 0] > 0 then limW!L(x)+ (W) =  1 due to the fact
that lottery x is bounded-valued. Notice further that limx!+1 A(x) = 0 means that the
decision maker becomes risk neutral when he gets extremely rich. Since expected value
of the lottery is assumed to be positive, E[x] > 0, therefore an extremely rich individual
will accept this lottery meaning that limW!+1 (W)  0.
It is worth noting that condition limx!0 A(x) = +1 is not sucient to ensure
limW!L(x)+ (W) < 0 and hence to ensure that an extended riskiness measure exists.
One needs stronger requirement of limx!0+ U(x) =  1, which shall be apparent in the
next subsection where CRRA class of utility functions is analyzed. There are CRRA
Lewandowski, Michal (2010), Risk Attitudes and Measures of Value for Risky Lotteries 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/14404Chapter 4. Generalized measure of riskiness 80
utility function, namely the ones for which relative risk aversion  is smaller than certain
cuto  such that limx!0 A(x) = +1 and yet limW!L(x)+ (W) > 0 meaning that an
extended riskiness measure does not exists. Observe however that in the next subsection
it proves benecial to use variable 1
W instead of W so that the comparison of the two
cases must be done with caution.
Before I will proceed to the next subsection, I want to demonstrate that for a certain
class of DARA utility functions which are not necessarily CRRA, no-bankruptcy is guar-
anteed. First I will need the following lemma, which is also of interest for its own sake.
Without loss of generality7 assume that utility function U satises the following: U(1) =
0 and U0(1) = 1. Given such utility function U dene relative risk aversion function as
RRA(x) =  
U00(x)x
U0(x) . For utility function which is denoted Ui I will use notation RRAi
for the corresponding relative risk aversion function. Then the following lemma is true.
Lemma 4.9. For some  > 0, suppose that RRAi(y) > RRAj(y) for all y such that
jyj < . Then Ui(y) < Uj(y) whenever y 6= 1 and jyj < 
Proof. First, let me say that the proof is very similar to that used in lemma 2 of Aumann
and Serrano [24]. They prove a similar proposition for absolute risk aversion.






























































7Cardinal utility function is unique only up to ane transformation.
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Hence logU0
i(y) 7 logU0
j(y), when y ? 1. It follows that U0
i(y) 7 U0
j(y), when y ? 1.




















And hence the lemma is proved.
Equipped with lemma 4.9 I can now demonstrate for which DARA utility functions in
general the condition of no-bankruptcy is guaranteed.
Proposition 4.10. For all bounded-valued lotteries and for all DARA utility functions
for which RRA(x)  1; 8x 2 D, where RRA(x) is relative risk aversion function
evaluated at x and D is the utility function's domain, no-bankruptcy is guaranteed.
Proof. No-bankruptcy is guaranteed for logarithmic utility function for which relative
risk aversion coecient is equal to one. Take a DARA utility function U for which
relative risk aversion is not less than one for all arguments in the domain of U. For any
wealth level W I can normalize U without loss of generality so that U(W) = log(W).
By lemma 4.9, since RRA(y)  1 for all nite y, it is true that U(y)  log(y) and by
normalization U(W) = log(W). It follows that if logarithmic utility function "rejects"
a lottery x, utility U also "rejects" this lottery. And hence it also guarantees no-
bankruptcy.
4.4.2 Existence, uniqueness and no-bankruptcy for CRRA




1  ; for 1 6=  > 0
logx; for  = 1
where x 2 [0;1]. I want to dene a measure R for lottery x for CRRA utility function.
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for a given lottery x and coecient . I want to ensure that such measure is well dened
and unique. As already proved in the previous subsection measure of riskiness is unique
if it exists. The necessary conditions are already provided in the former subsection and
in particular, I will focus only on non-degenerate n-dimensional lotteries x with bounded
values9 such that P[x < 0] > 0 and E(x) > 0. Furthermore, I will restrict attention
only to wealth levels W, such that W  L(x) > 0. The fact that L(x) > 0 follows from
the fact that x may take negative values. Dene lottery y = 1 + x
W . Notice that this
lottery takes only non-negative values. It takes the lowest value of zero for xi =  L(x)
for some i 2 f1;:::;ng, since W  L(x).
Notice that for the function form above, the following is true: U(1) = 0, U0(y) = y 
and U0(1) = 1. Suppose there are two dierent CRRA utility functions with relative
risk aversion coecients equal to i and j, respectively. Suppose further that i > j.
Then from lemma 4.9 I know that U(y;i) < U(y;j), for y 2 [0;), some  > 0 and


































0   
1
L(x)
; xi 2 [ L(x);+M(x)]
where M(x) is the maximal gain in x and L(x) is the maximal loss of x, both assumed
to be nite.
I want to nd out whether this function has a unique  > 0, for which this function is
equal to zero, given , and whether it has a unique  for which the function is equal to
zero, given that  = 1
L(x). It turns out that the answer to both questions is positive, as
I will demonstrate below.
9The following condition holds: there exists  > 0 such that jxij <  8i 2 f1;:::;ng.
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pi(1 + xi)   1 =
1
L(x)
E[x] > 0 (4.8)
Furthermore lim! 1
L(x) (;) is a continuous function of  and it is strictly monotonic
in  (see lemma 4.9). Therefore the following result holds:
Proposition 4.12. Given function (;) and a random variable x with n values de-
noted by xi for i = 1;:::;n, where E(x) > 0 and P[x < 0] > 0, the following is true.
Denote L = L(x) and M = M(x).




 <  ( 1
L;) > 0
 =  ( 1
L;) = 0
 >  ( 1
L;) < 0





 <  (;) > 0
 =  (;) = 0
 >  (;) < 0
Proof. Follows from the above stated properties of a function  (lemma 4.11).
The above proposition states that riskiness measure for CRRA is dened for   ,
where  depends on a lottery. In this case the riskiness measure is unique. For dierent
's from the set of 's satisfying  >  I get dierent , which is the inverse of the
riskiness measure. Let's dene a function (), where  >  and (();) = 0. I
have the following proposition:
Proposition 4.13. The function () is decreasing in .
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Since (;) is concave in  and ( 1
L;) < 0, I conclude that (2) > (1).
The above proposition states that the higher is , the relative risk aversion coecient,
the higher is riskiness measure, which is the inverse of (). It conrms a conjecture
that since rejecting for wealth being below riskiness measure based on  = 1 (Foster and
Hart [5] riskiness measure) guarantees no bankruptcy, also rejecting for wealth below
riskiness measure based on  > 1 guarantees no bankruptcy, as it means more rejection.
To illustrate the above propositions and clarify the meaning of the dierent concepts
and variables, look at the graph below:
Figure 4.1: An extended riskiness measure for CRRA utility
This graph depicts the shape of (;) function for dierent values of relative risk
aversion  within the CRRA class of utility functions. For  between 0 and  an
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extended riskiness measure is not dened since in this case function  does not cross the
zero axis. An extended riskiness measure is dened if   . Furthermore, it is also
clear from the picture that an extended riskiness measure for values of  greater than
1 is necessarily greater than RFH(x) and hence rejecting x at wealth smaller than the
extended riskiness measure in this case also guarantees no-bankruptcy.
4.5 Relation between riskiness measure and buying and
selling price for a lottery
This section provides a link between the concepts of buying and selling price for a
lottery and riskiness measure. The rst lemma below demonstrates that although the
riskiness measure for gambles with negative expectation or gambles without losses is not
meaningful, it becomes meaningful and well dened if buying price or selling price for
such gamble is subtracted from this gamble.
Lemma 4.14. Given a non-degenerate lottery x and wealth level W, such that B(W;x)
and S(W;x) exist, both R(x   B(W;x)) and R(x   S(W;x)) are well dened.
Proof. I have to prove that R(x   S(W;x)) and R(x   B(W;x)) exist for any lottery
x. Notice that by proposition 4.12, the riskiness measure R(x) exists for a lottery x
and  2 [;+1) if and only if E(x) > 0 and P[x < 0] > 0. I have to check these two
conditions for lotteries x S(W;x) and x B(W;x). Notice that for an arbitrary lottery
x, the following holds by proposition 4.27:
E[x   B(W;x)] > 0
E[x   S(W;x)] > 0
Notice further that by proposition 4.27,  L(x) < B(W;x) and  L(x) < S(W;x). Since
all the values in the support of x get positive probability
P[x   B(W;x) < 0] > 0
P[x   S(W;x) < 0] > 0
Hence the two necessary conditions for R(x S(W;x)) and R(x B(W;x)) to exists are
satised. For   1 these conditions are also sucient for existence of such measures
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by proposition 4.12. For 0 <  < 1, the following is true by proposition 4.410:
lim
W!WL(x)
B(W;x) = WL(x) + min(x)
lim
W! min(x)
S(W;x) = WL(x) + min(x)
where WL(x) = U 1[EU( min(x) + x)].
Hence WL(x)+min(x) is the minimal value for B and S when 0 <  < 1. By denition
of WL(x), the following holds:
WL(x) = R(x   (WLx + min(x)))
So the riskiness measure for x   S and x   B for the lowest possible value of S and B
(which is equal) is well dened and its value is WL(x). For higher values of S and B
approaching (but not reaching) E[x] the riskiness measure is well dened by proposition
4.12 and its value increases.
The opposite direction of the above lemma is as follows:
Lemma 4.15. If R(x   ) is well dened, where  2 R, then
 = S(R(x   )   ;x) = B(R(x   );x) (4.9)
Proof. The relationship in 4.9 follows from the denitions of R, S and B. Again for
  1, values of S and B in the equation above are well dened if R(x ) is well dened.
For 0 <  < 1 on the other hand the following is true. The riskiness measure is dened
for  > 11. By proposition 4.12, EU(L(x) +  + x) = U(L(x) + ). Hence WL(x)
dened in proposition 4.4 for utility function U is equal to L(x) +  =  min(x) + .
And thus the lowest values of buying and selling price when utility function is U are:
S(L(x);x) = B(L(x) + ;x) = 
If buying and selling price are well dened for the lowest wealth levels, they are also well
dened for higher wealth levels by proposition 4.4, and hence the lemma is proved.
The following proposition establishes a simple link between buying and selling price for
a lottery and the riskiness measure for this lottery.
10Notice that L(x) used in proposition 4.12 is the same as  min(x) used in proposition 4.4
11It is not indicated but 
 is lottery-dependent.
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Proposition 4.16. Given wealth level W  0, CRRA utility function U with RRA
coecient  in the interval (;+1), where  satises ( 1
L(x);) = 0, and any non-
degenerate lottery x, the following relations hold:
W = R(x   S(W;x))   S(W;x) (4.10)
W = R(x   B(W;x)) (4.11)
Proof. By lemma 4.14, measures R(x   S(W;x)) and R(x   B(W;x)) are well dened
for an arbitrary non-degenerate lottery x. Now, it follows from denitions of R(x) and
S(W;x), B(W;x) that:
E[U (R(x   B(W;x)) + x   B(W;x))] = U(R(x   B(W;x)))
E[U (R(x   S(W;x)) + x   S(W;x))] = U(R(x   S(W;x)))
Therefore, it has to be that W = R(x S(W;x)) S(W;x) and W = R(x B(W;x)).
For the next proposition I will need two lemmas. They establish certain delta properties
of the riskiness measure.
Lemma 4.17. Given lottery x and  2 R such that riskiness for x and x +  exists,
the following holds:
R(x + )  R(x)    ()   0
Proof. From the denition of R
0 = EU(R(x) + x)   U(R(x))
0 = EU(R(x + ) + x + )   U(R(x + ))
Since U is increasing,   0 if and only if
EU(R(x) + x)   U(R(x))  EU(R(x)    + x + )   U(R(x)   )
And hence
0 = EU(R(x + ) + x + )   U(R(x + ))
 EU(R(x)    + x + )   U(R(x)   )
Thus by proposition 4.12
R(x + )  R(x)   
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Lemma 4.18. Given lottery x and  2 R such that riskiness for x and x +  exists,
the following holds:
R(x + )  R(x) ()   0
Proof. "Only if" part follows from lemma 4.17. "If" part can be proved as follows: By
denition of R.
0 = EU(R(x) + x)   U(R(x))
0 = EU(R(x + ) + x + )   U(R(x + ))
By proposition 4.12, and since R(x + )  R(x), EU(R(x) + x + )   U(R(x))  0.
And since utility is increasing it must be that   0.
Note that lemma 4.17 and lemma 4.18 both imply that it is impossible for R(x+) to
be between R(x)    and R(x).
Now I can state a series of main results of this section which establish a well dened
connection between riskiness measure and buying and selling price for a lottery.
Proposition 4.19. Given wealth W and two lotteries x and y, if there exist wealth
levels W1;W2 such that S(W1;x) = S(W;y) and S(W2;y) = S(W;x). Then:
S(W;x)  S(W;y)
()
R(y   S(W;x))  R(x   S(W;x))  R(y   S(W;y))  R(x   S(W;y)) (4.12)
Proof. The requirement that there exist wealth levels W1;W2 such that S(W1;x) =
S(W;y) and S(W2;y) = S(W;x) guarantees that R(x   S(W;y)) and R(y   S(W;x))
are well dened. This is so due to lemma 4.14. Also, R(x S(W;x)) and R(y S(W;y))
are well dened due to this lemma. I will now prove the equivalency stated in the
proposition sequentially for the three inequalities in (4.12).
S(W;x)  S(W;y) () R(y   S(W;y))  R(x   S(W;y))
Let  = S(W;x)   S(W;y). By lemma 4.17,   0 if and only if
R(x   S(W;x))   R(x   S(W;x) + )  
And after substituting the denition of 
R(x   S(W;x))   R(x   S(W;y))  S(W;x)   S(W;y)
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By proposition 4.16, this is in turn equivalent to the following:
R(x   S(W;x))   R(x   S(W;y))  R(x   S(W;x))   R(y   S(W;y))
And after simplifying
R(y   S(W;y))  R(x   S(W;y))
Which is what I had to prove. Now notice that the second inequality R(x S(W;x)) 
R(y   S(W;y)) is equivalent to S(W;x)  S(W;y) by proposition 4.16. It leaves the
one remaining inequality to be proved.
S(W;x)  S(W;y) () R(y   S(W;x))  R(x   S(W;x))
Let  = S(W;y)   S(W;x). Lemma 4.17 can be restated as follows:
R(x + )  R(x)    ()   0
And hence replacing x with y   S(W;y)
R(y   S(W;y))   R(y   S(W;y) + )  
And after substituting the denition of 
R(y   S(W;y))   R(y   S(W;x))  S(W;y)   S(Wx)
By proposition 4.16 this is equivalent to
R(y   S(W;y))   R(y   S(W;x))  R(y   S(W;y))   R(x   S(W;x))
And after simplifying
R(y   S(W;x))  R(x   S(W;x))
This nishes the proof.
The above proposition establishes that selling price for lottery x is not lower than the
selling price for another lottery y at some wealth level if and only if the riskiness measure
of y S(W;x) is not lower than x S(W;x) and y S(W;y) is not lower than x S(W;y).
A similar proposition is obtained for buying price for a lottery.
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Proposition 4.20. Given wealth W and two lotteries x and y, if there exist wealth
levels W1;W2 such that B(W1;x) = B(W;y) and B(W2;y) = B(W;x). Then:
B(W;x)  B(W;y)
()
R(y   B(W;x))  R(x   B(W;x)) = R(y   B(W;y))  R(x   B(W;y))
Proof. As in the previous proposition, all the riskiness measures are well dened due
to lemma 4.14 and the assumption that there exist wealth levels W1;W2 such that
S(W1;x) = S(W;y) and S(W2;y) = S(W;x) hold.
By proposition 4.16, R(x B(W;x)) = R(y B(W;y)). The two remaining inequalities
can be proved by using lemma 4.18.
R(y   B(W;x))  R(y   B(W;y)) () B(W;x)  B(W;y)
() R(x   B(W;x))  R(x   B(W;y))
The two propositions above establish a link between selling and buying price for a lottery
and the riskiness measure for gambles with prices. Even if riskiness measure for a given
gamble is not meaningful due to the fact that the gamble has negative expectation or
no losses, it is still meaningful and well-dened for gambles with prices, i.e. for gambles
constructed by subtracting buying or selling price from the original gamble.
The above two proposition can be extended beyond their local (for a given wealth level)
meaning. The following corollary to these propositions states a global result on extended
riskiness with prices in relation to selling (and as it will turn out also buying) price for
a lottery:











Then the following equivalence holds:
R(y   s)  R(x   s) () s 2 fs : s = S(W;x);W 2 Wg
where W = fW : S(W;x)  S(W;y)g.
First, the above corollary could alternatively be stated in terms of buying price. To
see this, observe the following. If W is wealth level at which selling prices of x and
y cross, i.e. S(W;x) = S(W;y) = S, then by lemma 3.23, it holds that: S =
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B(W+S;x) = B(W+S;y). Now, let's dene an equivalent of set W for the case of
buying price: V = fW : B(W;x)  B(W;y)g. The sets W and V are obviously dierent.
However, by the argument I have just given, the sets fs : s = S(W;x);W 2 Wg and
fs : s = B(W;x);W 2 Vg are the same. This is why the proposition above can be stated
both in terms of selling price as well as in terms of buying price.
Condition (4.13) guarantees that s has to be in the range of both S(W;x) and S(W;y) as
functions of wealth. In case of CRRA utility function, since proposition 4.4 establishes
exactly what the range of buying and selling price is, this condition can be written
explicitly. Suppose, for instance, that utility function is CRRA with coecient of relative
risk aversion greater than 1. In this case condition (4.13) takes the following form:
s 2 [maxfmin(x);min(y)g;minfE[x];E[y]g].
Cases in which the interval in (4.13) is empty, are not interesting since either x is
unambiguously better than y12, or the other way around. Of course, in such a case it is
possible to establish a similar (to the one above) proposition, where riskiness of lotteries
with dierent prices would be compared, i.e. the riskiness of x   s1 and y   s2, where
s1 6= s2. However, this would be a rather dierent exercise to the one I wish to pursue
in this section.
The next two propositions inform us what can be inferred about the riskiness measure
from the global properties of selling and buying price as functions of wealth. These
results are in fact special cases of the above corollary. However it is useful to state them
and prove independently.
Proposition 4.22. Given lotteries x and y and DARA utility function for which "risk-
iness measures" R(x) and R(y) are well dened, the following holds:
B(W;y) > B(W;x) 8W =) R(x) > R(y)
Proof. Suppose not. Then R(x)  R(y). By the proposition 4.16 equation (4.11), given
any x for which R is dened and unique I have for W = R(x):
R(x) = R(x   B(R(x);x))
By the uniqueness of R(x) I get that B(R(x);x) = 0. From the fact that B is increasing
in wealth for DARA utility (proposition 4.31) I have:
B(R(y);y) = 0 = B(R(x);x)  B(R(y);x)
This proves that 9W, such that B(W;y)  B(W;x).
12All the values in x are higher than those in y.
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Proposition 4.23. Given lotteries x and y and DARA utility function for which "risk-
iness measures" R(x) and R(y) are well dened. Then:
S(W;y) > S(W;x) 8W =) R(x) > R(y)
Proof. Suppose not. Then R(x)  R(y). From the proof of proposition 4.22 I know that
given any x for which R is dened and unique B(R(x);x) = 0. Hence, by proposition
4.29, I know that S(R(x);x) = 0. From the the fact that S is increasing in wealth for
DARA utility (corollary 4.28)I have:
S(R(y);y) = 0 = S(R(x);x)  S(R(y);x)
This proves that 9W, such that S(W;y)  S(W;x).
The reverse direction in the above two propositions at the same time cannot be true,
at least in the case of DARA utilities. To see it I can use the proposition 2.15 from the
second chapter of this thesis which states that preference reversal for DARA utilities is
possible. That means that given any DARA utility there exist two lotteries x and y
such that the following holds:
S(W;y) > S(W;x) > B(W;x) > B(W;y)
If the reverse direction in both propositions 4.22 and 4.23 was true, the above pattern
would not be possible. And hence the reverse direction of both propositions cannot be
true. Whether the reverse direction in one case is true and in another is not or whether
the reverse direction in both cases is not true remains unknown.
Below I wish to examine further connections between riskiness measure and buying and
selling price for a lottery. The proposition below is an extension to Pratt [4] famous
theorem on comparative risk aversion. It shows that riskiness measure can be used
along with buying price and selling price to compare risk aversion across individuals.
Proposition 4.24. Given two CRRA utility functions U1, U2 with RRA coecients 1
and 2, respectively, both in the interval (;+1), where  satises ( 1
L(x);) = 0,
and any non-degenerate lottery x, such that R1(x) and R2(x) exists, the following holds:
R1(x) > R2(x) () B1(W;x) < B2(W;x) 8W () S1(W;x) < S2(W;x) 8W
where Ri, Bi and Si are, respectively, the riskiness measure, the buying price and the
selling price corresponding to utility function Ui.
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Proof. The second equivalence above is a special case (CRRA) of proposition 4.33 and
hence was already proved there. I need to prove the rst equivalence.
((=)
I start by assuming B1(W;x) < B2(W;x) 8W. By lemma 4.14 I know that Ri(x  
Si(W;x)) and Ri(x   Bi(W;x)) exist. By proposition 4.16 I know that W = R(x  
B(W;x)). Furthermore, I know that B(R(x);x) = 0. Therefore:
R1(x) = R1(x   B1(R1(x);x))
= R2(x   B2(R1(x);x))
> R2(x)
Since B2(R1(x);x) > B1(R1(x);x) = 0, the last inequality follows from lemma 4.18.
That the riskiness measure R2(x B2(R1(x);x)) is well dened follows from the similar
argument as in the proof of lemma 4.14. Since x was arbitrary, the above implication
holds generally.
(=))
I start by assuming R1(y) > R2(y) for all y, such that R1 and R2 are dened. This
holds in particular for lottery y = x B1(W;x), for some W. It follows from proposition
4.16, that:
W = R2(x   B2(W;x)) = R1(x   B1(W;x))
> R2(x   B1(W;x))
And hence I know that R2(x B2(W;x)) > R2(x B1(W;x)). By lemma 4.18, I conclude
that B1(W;x) < B2(W;x). Since wealth W was arbitrary, as well as lottery x, the proof
is nished.
I proved that one can use buying and selling price for a lottery as well as riskiness
measure as equivalent ways to express absolute risk aversion. Although the proof is
only valid for the CRRA case, the proposition is true whenever the existence of riskiness
measure for the appropriate lotteries is guaranteed.
4.6 Expected utility decision-making using riskiness mea-
sure and buying and selling price for a lottery
Finally in this section, I will show how one can make decisions based on the concepts of
buying and selling price for a lottery or riskiness measure. It shall come as no surprise
that no matter with help of what concepts decisions are made within expected utility
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theory, they give rise to equivalent decision criteria.
Consider two situations.
 Case A: A decision maker with wealth W  0 considers buying a nondegenerate
lottery x for a price b 2 (min(x);E[x])
 Case B decision maker with wealth W  0 participating in a nondegenerate lottery
x considers selling lottery x for a price s 2 (min(x);E[x])
Proposition 4.25. Given utility function U and lottery x, such that the arguments of
U are in the domain of U amd S(W;x) and B(W;x) are both well dened, the following
criteria for decision making are equivalent:
 Expected utility criterion:
{ Case A: Buy x if EU(W + x   b)  U(W), otherwise don't buy.
{ Case B: Sell x if EU(W + x)  U(W + s), otherwise don't sell.
 Buying/selling price criterion:
{ Case A: Buy x if B(W;x)  b, otherwise don't buy.
{ Case B: Sell x if S(W;x)  s, otherwise don't sell.
 Riskiness measure criterion:
{ Case A: Buy x if W  R(x   b)
{ Case B: Sell x if W  R(x   s)   s
Proof. The proof follows from the respective denitions and hence is omitted. Notice
that since b;s 2 (min(x);E[x]), R(x b) and R(x s) are well dened by lemma 4.14.
4.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I analyzed riskiness measure as introduced by Foster and Hart [5]. I gave
simple intuition behind their result and I tried to make some steps towards extending
this measure in two respects - rst to dene an extended riskiness measure based on
DARA utility functions and derive necessary and sucient conditions for existence and
uniqueness of such measure for DARA and CRRA class of utility functions. Obviously,
for the more specialized case of CRRA utility functions more exact conditions are ob-
tained than for the more general case of DARA utilities. I also tried to extend the
domain of riskiness measure. For gambles with non-positive expectation or no losses I
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proposed a way to compare their riskiness by subtracting prices from them. If the risk-
iness ordering is unchanged over the whole range of prices for which the lottery minus
the price exists is unchanged, something can be inferred about the riskiness of a gamble
without prices. To this end a number of useful properties relating buying and selling
price for a lottery and riskiness measure were established and should be useful also for
their own sake. An extension of Pratt [4] famous result on comparative risk aversion
involving riskiness measure along with buying and selling price for a lottery was stated
and proved. Finally a simple link between decision-making using riskiness measure and
decision-making using buying and selling price was developed.
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Appendix
Lemma 4.26. Given any lottery x and wealth level W, the following three relations
between buying price and selling price hold:
S[W;x   B(W;x)] = 0 (4.14)
S[W   B(W;x);x] = B(W;x) (4.15)
B[W + S(W;x);x] = S(W;x) (4.16)
Proposition 4.27. For any non-degenerate lottery x and any wealth W such that buying
and selling price exist, S(W;x) and B(W;x) lie in the interval (min(x);E(x)). For a
degenerate lottery x, S(W;x) = B(W;x) = x.
The following is a corollary to Pratt [4] famous theorem of comparative risk aversion.
Corollary 4.28. For a strictly increasing and twice dierentiable utility function U with
continuous second derivative, the following holds:
 S(W;x) is increasing/constant/decreasing in W for every x i A(W) is decreas-
ing/constant/increasing in W
Proposition 4.29. For any lottery x and any wealth W, for utilities with decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA) the following equivalence holds:
B(W;x) > 0 () B(W;x) < S(W;x)
Proposition 4.30. For any lottery x and any wealth level W and for  2 R, the
following holds:
B(W;x + ) = B(W;x) +  (4.17)
S(W;x + ) = S(W + ;x) +  (4.18)
Notice that for DARA utility function and B(W;x) > 0 the above result together with
proposition 4.29 implies the following:
S(W;x + )   B(W;x + ) = S(W + ;x)   B(W;x) > S(W;x)   B(W;x)
Proposition 4.31. For a strictly increasing and twice dierentiable utility function U
with continuous second derivative, the following holds:
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 B(W;x) is increasing/constant/decreasing in W for every x i A(W) is decreas-
ing/constant/increasing in W
Lemma 4.32. For dierentiable DARA utility functions, given any n-dimensional non-
degenerate lottery x and any wealth level W, the following holds:
 EU0(W + x)   U0(W + S(W;x)) > 0
 EU0(W + x   B(W;x))   U0(W) > 0




Proof. From the denition of buying, selling price and the fact that they are both










EU0(W + x   B(W;x))   U0(W)
EU0(W + x   B(W;x))
> 0
All of the properties above follow immediately.
Proposition 4.33. For two dierent utility functions U1 and U2, any wealth level W
and any n-dimensional non-degenerate random variable x with bounded values, I dene
corresponding selling and buying prices S1(W;x), B1(W;x) and S2(W;x), B2(W;x).
The following equivalence holds:
8W 8x : 9  > 0 jxij <  8i 2 f1;:::;ng
S1(W;x) > S2(W;x) () B1(W;x) > B2(W;x)
Proposition 4.34. The following two statements are equivalent:
i. Bernoulli utility function exhibits CRRA
ii. buying and selling price for any lottery are homogeneous of degree one i.e.
S(W;x) = S(W;x); 8 > 0
B(W;x) = B(W;x); 8 > 0
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